a contest of beneficence 117
a consequence, over time there has been a decline in the participation of
great powers and classic middle powers in UN peacekeeping operations
(Neack 1995 , 185 ). This point deserves further elaboration.
Bobrow and Boyer ( 1997 ) define active peacekeeping nations as those
who participate in at least 20 percent of the operations. While this mea-
surement ignores the large number of token participants, it does capture
some level of commitment to peacekeeping. The authors claim that the
group of activist countries remained relatively stable, indicating a domestic
institutionalization of the peacekeeping tradition. However, even based
on Bobrow and Boyer’s problematic data, we can easily observe a signifi-
cant decline in traditional activists’ commitment to peacekeeping over the
years. An analysis of this data shows that the ranking of peacekeeping ac-
tivists in the pre- and post- 1988 periods shows a correlation of 0. 25. This
suggests significant change in the relative commitments of peacekeeping
activists over this period. The data show that a country that was a leader
in peacekeeping operations in the pre- 1988 period was likely to be signifi-
cantly less committed to peacekeeping operations in the post- 1988 period.
Indeed, in a study of the Nordic peacekeeping model, Jakobsen ( 2006 )
finds a dramatic decline in Nordic participation in peacekeeping missions
at a time when the number and size of these operations showed consid-
erable growth. These findings are consistent with Neack’s observation of
peacekeeping’s “middle- powers- drain.” It is difficult to identify similar
trends in other types of prosociality.
This “middle- powers- drain” is consistent with the expectations of the
conspicuous consumption model. The inflation in the number of contrib-
utors to UN peacekeeping operations indicates that peacekeeping lacks
restrictions on entry — it is a poor test of status. Participation in peace-
keeping operations is simply too cheap. It is therefore not an exclusive
enough club to retain the interest of middle powers. This can explain the
gradual withdrawal of great and middle powers from peacekeeping op-
erations. With so many smaller participants, UN peacekeeping cannot
provide as much prestige as it used to do in the past. In fact, Jakobsen
reaches precisely these conclusions when analyzing patterns of Nordic
participation in peacekeeping operations.
The rise of the Nordic model can, in short, be explained by the fact that it
generated power, pride and prestige on the cheap.... The fall of the Nordic
model can in short be explained by the massive increase in the number of troop
contributors, which made it impossible for the Nordics to maintain their posi-
tion as major troop contributors. (Jakobsen 2006 , 386 , 390 )