The Price of Prestige

130 chapter five

What are the expected benefits? Who benefits? And to the extent that

such a question can be objectively answered, is Big Science an efficient way

of achieving these goals?

Big Science is rarely if ever a “pure Veblen good.” In almost all cases we

can find solid material motivations for Big Science that can provide alter-

native answers to “the cuckoo cry of cui bono.” These answers constitute

a set of complementary explanations to the conspicuous consumption ar-

gument. We can break up these arguments into three primary- utility justi-

fications for Big Science: ( 1 ) Big Science is a form of strategic investment

(either militarily and /or economically), ( 2 ) Big Science is a tool for the

accumulation of knowledge, and ( 3 ) Big Science is driven by local inter-

est groups. The following section explores each of these explanations and

demonstrates the complementary importance of conspicuous consump-

tion for the understanding of Big Science in international relations.

Big Science as Strategic Investment

Today the connection between science and national power seems self-

evident. The Manhattan Project, often described as the first major case

of Big Science, provided indisputable evidence for the decisive role of

science in a country’s war- waging abilities. This lesson served as a trig-

ger for an unprecedented upsurge in government funding in subsequent

years. Consequently, certain Big Science programs can be perceived as

hothouses for the development of militarily relevant technologies, such as

ballistic missiles and satellites in the case of the space program. In some

cases, procurement programs can be Big Science without the “scientific”

facade; in others, the military benefits from spin- off technologies. How-

ever, while the Manhattan Project demonstrated that basic research can

have strategic implications, its effect seems to be the exception rather

than the rule. Project Hindsight, a study conducted by the US Defense

Department, concluded that very little post – World War II basic research

had any influence over weapon procurement (Greenberg 1967 , 163 n).

Governmental support of Big Science can also be perceived as a genera-

tor of economic growth. Since R & D requires high capital, high risk, and

long- term investment, it is not very attractive for private investors. More-

over, scientific inquiry often results in forms of collective goods available

freely even to those who did not partake in the investment. Hence, costly

R & D can be easily hampered by market failure (Mansfield 1966 , 477 ).

Consequently, government intervention is needed in order to generate

the necessary goods (Stigler 1971 ; Pavitt 1973 ). Again, positive economic