The Price of Prestige

134 chapter five

to imagine that a passionate interest in astronomy among congressmen

or their constituencies played a critical role in creating broad congressio-

nal support for the American space program. When Republican senators

Thurmond, Goldwater, and Laxalt wrote that “it would be tragic for the

United States not to be in the Halley race” in 1981 , it was not because of a

keen interest in comet morphology (Logsdon 1989 ). The tragedy, for them,

was an injury to American prestige, not a loss of scientific data. Finally,

the constant bickering within the scientific community regarding the ques-

tionable scientific merit of Big Science further erodes the credibility of

the “quest for knowledge” hypothesis.

Big Science as Pork- Barrel Politics

In 1961 , the National Science Foundation (NSF) was in charge of the

construction of the Mohole’s drilling vessel. The chosen design was to be

approved by Congress. NSF director Alan Waterman selected a Texas

company despite its questionable record in order to gain favor with frugal

Texas Congressman Albert Thomas, who controlled the NSF budget in

the House. In the subsequent hearing, Thomas was “in an unusual affable

mood” and described the proposed budget as a “work of art” (Greenberg

1967 , 191 ).^10 Waterman’s decision to hire a Texas- based contractor proved

politically expedient because it helped secure congressional funding for

the project. Unfortunately, by selecting a politically expedient contractor

rather than more experienced and capable competitors, Waterman’s deci-

sion also led to the ultimate undoing of the project. The contractor was

never able to procure the drilling vessel, and the project was abandoned.

As the Mohole example demonstrates, Big Science is often aligned with

local interests by directing large government funds to specific localities and

generating high- paying jobs, improved infrastructure, an influx of young

professionals, and a better image and higher media profile. It is no wonder,

therefore, that the American space program would be popular with Tex-

ans and Floridians and, consequently, with their elected representatives.

An experienced public official like Waterman knew how to use this type of

pork- barrel politics in order to fund Big Science.^11

However, while pork- barrel politics highlights an important aspect of

Big Science, it fails to explain several important dimensions. First, Big

Science often enjoys broad appeal outside the benefiting communities

and even outside the borders of the funding country. Moreover, and most

importantly, it cannot explain why these projects are designed to begin

with. Though it is easy to see why Texans support the space program,