big science and the transits of venus 149
the South Sea, which opened the door to British colonization of Australia
and New Zealand. But even this benefit had little to do with the transit
observation itself. Accordingly, the best explanation for the continuing
allure of Big Science resides not in primary but rather in secondary utility.
Consumption patterns of Big Science remain stable as long as it continues
to be a credible status symbol. Counterintuitively, the more useless and
expensive the TOV races proved to be, the more effective status symbols
they became. Big Science continues to serve a similar purpose today. It
remains a tool for outspending others more than a tool for the advance
of knowledge. In fact, the similarities between the transit races and more
recent scientific “competitions” are so striking that it is difficult not to
conclude that they, too, share a common underlying cause.
The funding for transit expeditions is especially striking when compared
with contemporaneous levels of governmental investment in the sciences.
Governments were generally reluctant to invest in science unless it was
framed as part of international competition. Moreover, the transits created
unambiguous focal points for international status- enhancing efforts. This
boosted the conspicuousness of the investment as all eyes were literally fo-
cused on the same event. For politicians this was an attractive feature, and
TOV advocates used it to their advantage. Unlike other scientific projects,
the transits presented a solid time frame, relatively clear budgetary param-
eters, and fairly low levels of uncertainty (provided the politician was in-
terested in the expedition as such rather than in its actual scientific value).
The transit races display all the hallmarks of conspicuous consumption:
they were costly, wasteful, and eye catching; they provided very few mate-
rial benefits yet were considered a status symbol; the discourse surrounding
them was filled with references to prestige and celebrated the voluntary bur-
den that was involved in such undertakings. Moreover, actors clearly per-
ceived their investment competitively. They demonstrated a preference for
conspicuousness by funding expeditions while failing to fund the analysis of
the collected data. They argued over who sent expeditions to the most inhos-
pitable locations. This led to uncoordinated and redundant efforts. Interest-
ingly, relative investment in transit observations closely mirrors power shifts
throughout this period. The number of stations and their locations reflects
the rise of Britain and the relative decline of France, the emergence of the
United States and of Germany, and the frantic yet unsuccessful attempt of
the Russians to catch up with the rest of the industrialized world. Big Science
thus proved to be a relatively reliable measure of international status.
The Big Science example highlights the two- level game of conspicuous
consumption. Domestic entrepreneurs select projects that could generate
