notes to pages 23–29 171
- Hopkins and Kornienko 2004 ; Keynes ( 1930 ) 1991 , 358 – 73. See also Due-
senberry 1949 ; Dupor and Liu 2003 ; Easterlin 1995. - Kohler’s application of Veblen offers a plausible explanation for arms races
but fails to support it with convincing empirical evidence. As Deleu and Wiberg
( 1978 , 348 ) note in their critique of Kohler’s article, “Let us repeat that we believe
that Kohler’s explanation has some validity, even without seeing any solid empiri-
cal evidence. But such evidence would be required if his proposal is that this is the
main explanation and that it is better than all its competitors — and until then, it
can hardly be used as a point of departure for attempts at disarmament.” See also
Kohler 1979. - In this sense, this analysis diverges from Jervis’s analysis of signals and im-
ages in international relations. Jervis describes this analysis as a “theory of decep-
tion in international relations” (Jervis 1989 , 10 ). While for Jervis the manipulation
of signals and indexes involves some dimension of deceit and bluffing, the Veble-
nian analysis sees conspicuous consumption as part of a wider social institution
rather than intentional deceit. - Similarly, for Deutsch ( 1978 ) the realm of politics highlights institutions
that are taken for granted by actors, most of whom are often hardly aware of the
existence of these institutions because they are already part of institutionalized
patterns of habitual compliance. It is this automatic compliance, according to
Deutch ( 1978 , 478 ), that should be the main focus of the study of politics because
it is “not the end of political domination, but its near perfection.” - For an elaborate discussion of the effects of prestige on taste, see Veblen
( 1899 ) 1979 , 115 – 66. Similarly, Bourdieu’s seminal work on “Distinction” explores
the connection between taste, class, and social hierarchy (Bourdieu 1984 ). Veblen
and Bourdieu differ somewhat on the connection between price and taste. For Veb-
len, taste is a way to justify and mask the importance of cost. For Bourdieu, taste
seems to precede and direct price. Interestingly, recent research in behavioral eco-
nomics offers further support for the connection between price and taste. In an ex-
periment, Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely ( 2005 ) found that more expensive drugs gener-
ated a more robust placebo effect. That is, respondents rated more expensive drugs
as having greater positive effect on their health even though in practice there was
no difference between the cheaper and more expensive pills. A simple difference
in price, therefore, had a significant effect on actor’s preferences and experiences. - Neorealism, a rational approach that borrows a lot of its basic concepts
from economic theory, demonstrates similar circularity: “On the one hand, it
claims that (the distribution of ) power is the main criterion for the explanation of
outcomes. On the other, in some cases the outcomes are the main criterion for the
assessment of power(s)” (Guzzini 1993 , 449 ). - For an analysis of the dynamics governing admission to the great- powers
club, see Heimann 2014 ; Volgy et al. 2011.