explaining conspicuous consumption 11
their group’s relative position, thus boosting their own self- esteem. Con-
sequently, individual prestige seeking is mirrored by similar competition
among groups (Mercer 1995 , 241 – 43 ). Because in Tajfel’s experiments dis-
crimination is a costly strategy, participants are showing a willingness to
incur cost in an attempt to improve the prestige of their respective groups.
Social identity theory views self- esteem as an end in and of itself. The
desire for prestige is a means for generating pride. Therefore, if individuals
gain pride through membership in a prestigious group, then, for a citizen,
an improvement of her state’s relative position in the international hier-
archy becomes a worthy goal regardless of whether it is accommodated
by material gains. Megasports events such as the Olympic Games or the
World Cup provide a good illustration of this point. The 2014 Winter
Games in Sochi, for example, cost at least US$ 51 billion. The 2018 World
Cup in Russia is expected to cost at least US$ 21 billion, though some esti-
mates fear that this figure will double by the time of the games (Muller and
Wolfe 2014 , 2 ). The cost of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens increased
Greek sovereign debt by about 2 – 3 percent. Many analysts argue that this
financial deficit contributed directly to the outbreak of the Greek financial
and economic crisis later in the decade (Panagitopoulou 2014 ). The exor-
bitant cost of such events raises important questions. Why would individu-
als in the hosting countries support such expense? Why would leaders of
hosting countries (or cities) bid for such expensive events to begin with?
Indeed, public opinion polls in Russia in the years leading to Sochi iden-
tified growing concerns regarding the advisability of the Russian invest-
ment in the games. However, once the games started, public support for
the games galvanized, and respondents reported a sense of national pride
(Wolfe 2015 ). Similarly, Kuper and Szymanski ( 2009 ) argue that leaders
are aware that megasports events are not likely to generate significant eco-
nomic returns. However, they claim that the games generate psychosocial
returns in the form of public happiness and national pride (see also Nooij
and Van den Berg 2013 ). Moreover, public polls in China following the
2008 Beijing Olympics demonstrate that this sense of pride is connected
to international prestige. Respondents saw the games as an instrument
for enhancing Chinese international reputation and for consolidating
Chinese national identity. The expectation for private economic benefits
was weaker and less significant (Ying, Kolstad, and Yang 2013 ).^27
If public opinion on Sochi and Beijing is indicative of a more general
approach to megaevents, it may offer an explanation for leaders’ pref-
erences. Political leaders may choose to partake in such costly public