The Price of Prestige

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explaining conspicuous consumption 11


their group’s relative position, thus boosting their own self- esteem. Con-

sequently, individual prestige seeking is mirrored by similar competition

among groups (Mercer 1995 , 241 – 43 ). Because in Tajfel’s experiments dis-

crimination is a costly strategy, participants are showing a willingness to

incur cost in an attempt to improve the prestige of their respective groups.

Social identity theory views self- esteem as an end in and of itself. The

desire for prestige is a means for generating pride. Therefore, if individuals

gain pride through membership in a prestigious group, then, for a citizen,

an improvement of her state’s relative position in the international hier-

archy becomes a worthy goal regardless of whether it is accommodated

by material gains. Megasports events such as the Olympic Games or the

World Cup provide a good illustration of this point. The 2014 Winter

Games in Sochi, for example, cost at least US$ 51 billion. The 2018 World

Cup in Russia is expected to cost at least US$ 21 billion, though some esti-

mates fear that this figure will double by the time of the games (Muller and

Wolfe 2014 , 2 ). The cost of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens increased

Greek sovereign debt by about 2 – 3 percent. Many analysts argue that this

financial deficit contributed directly to the outbreak of the Greek financial

and economic crisis later in the decade (Panagitopoulou 2014 ). The exor-

bitant cost of such events raises important questions. Why would individu-

als in the hosting countries support such expense? Why would leaders of

hosting countries (or cities) bid for such expensive events to begin with?

Indeed, public opinion polls in Russia in the years leading to Sochi iden-

tified growing concerns regarding the advisability of the Russian invest-

ment in the games. However, once the games started, public support for

the games galvanized, and respondents reported a sense of national pride

(Wolfe 2015 ). Similarly, Kuper and Szymanski ( 2009 ) argue that leaders

are aware that megasports events are not likely to generate significant eco-

nomic returns. However, they claim that the games generate psychosocial

returns in the form of public happiness and national pride (see also Nooij

and Van den Berg 2013 ). Moreover, public polls in China following the

2008 Beijing Olympics demonstrate that this sense of pride is connected

to international prestige. Respondents saw the games as an instrument

for enhancing Chinese international reputation and for consolidating

Chinese national identity. The expectation for private economic benefits

was weaker and less significant (Ying, Kolstad, and Yang 2013 ).^27

If public opinion on Sochi and Beijing is indicative of a more general

approach to megaevents, it may offer an explanation for leaders’ pref-

erences. Political leaders may choose to partake in such costly public
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