The Price of Prestige

(lily) #1

notes to pages 72–77 177


rier, had finally to accept the demise of its aging carrier, Veinticinco de Mayo. The
carrier was de facto out of service since 1986. The costs of a revamp were esti-
mated at $ 150 million, with uncertain results (Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 21, 1997 ,
26 ). The Argentine navy hoped to maintain its aviation skills by using the Brazil-
ian carrier for its training. Even in the face of a worsening economic crisis, the
Argentine navy still hoped to regain carrier capabilities (D’Odorico 2001 , 78 – 79 ;
English 1992 ).



  1. As noted in chap. 1 , emerging powers tend to be especially prone to Veb-
    len effects. Hence, it is not surprising to find Brazil involved in various cases of
    conspicuous consumption. The Brazilian space program is another example. Jang
    ( 2004 , 217 ) argues that the enhancement of Brazil’s international prestige was an
    important policy goal of the Brazilian regime between 1964 and 1985. The Brazil-
    ian government adopted several large- scale projects during those years, such as
    building the world’s longest bridge (a fourteen- kilometer-span bridge connecting
    Rio de Janeiro and Niteroi), the erection of the world’s largest hydroelectric dam,
    the expensive and complicated construction of the trans- Amazonian highway, and
    the commissioning of ten nuclear power plants. Jang concludes, “Military leaders’
    perception of Brazilian security, prosperity and sovereignty centered on national
    values concerning Brazilian prestige. The leaders pursued various policies to in-
    crease national prestige... and they heavily influenced defense policies even un-
    der subsequent civilian regimes” (Jang 2004 , 217 ). See also Perry and Weiss 1986.

  2. Interestingly, Brazil allowed Chinese pilots to use the São Paulo as a train-
    ing platform. Because Brazil is one of the only countries to operate a CATOBAR,
    this was a rare opportunity for the Chinese and a strong signal of the tenuous
    status of US- Brazil relations (Ryczkowski 2012 ).

  3. When the British government decided to build new, larger carriers in 2001 ,
    the French defense minister described the decision as a significant change, because
    “the British, after having no aircraft carriers for a very long time, have decided to
    build two new ones before this decade is over” (Radio France Internationale, Sat-
    urday, April 28 , 2001 ). For the French minister, the Invincible, Illustrious, and Ark
    Royal were too small and insignificant to be described as carriers.

  4. Some reports suggest that Britain may be searching for a way to cancel the
    procurement of at least one of its two new carriers because of economic constraints.
    It was suggested that India might be interested in purchasing the unfinished vessel
    or that one of the vessels might serve as a helicopter carrier as a cost- cutting mea-
    sure. With a fleet of only one carrier, Britain will need to coordinate with France in
    order to ensure that at least one medium- sized European carrier is operational at
    any given time. Other options include building the carriers as STOVL rather than
    CATOBAR in order to simplify the design and reduce the cost (Webb 2009 ; Smith
    2009 ).

  5. India is the only country in the Indian Ocean region with significant lo-
    cal shipbuilding capabilities. Yet in practice, the standards of local shipbuilding

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