explaining conspicuous consumption 15
find that the handicap principle is tightly connected to issues of hierarchy
and prestige (Zahavi and Zahavi 1997 , 141 – 49 ). Extending the theory to
anthropology, Alden and Blige Bird ( 2000 ) explain altruistic patterns of
turtle hunting among the Meriam of the Torres Strait islands. Hunters
who volunteer to supply turtle meat to community gatherings enjoy bet-
ter marriage deals and are the only young men who feel secure enough to
speak at tribal meetings.^33 These hunters incur cost — a voluntary handi-
cap — in terms of equipment, risk, and time. Through this investment they
demonstrate their superior abilities and consequently gain respect and
deference in return. In this case, prestige brings about tangible benefits
but requires an investment of time, effort, and resources. Similarly, Sosis
( 2000 ) finds that among the fishermen of the Infaluk Atoll, canoe owners
often deliberately adopt a suboptimal but conspicuous method of fishing,
thus accepting a voluntary handicap as a means for gaining prestige.^34
Similarly, when Brazil decides to buy a naval vessel, it has to calculate
not only how such a purchase could satisfy its strategic needs but also
what such a purchase would signal regarding its social standing. Thus, the
purchase of an expensive, aging aircraft carrier is not necessarily directed
at any regional adversary but is rather an attempt to broadcast Brazil’s
improved social station.^35 Brazil is accepting a voluntary handicap by pa-
rading a highly vulnerable vessel at great cost and with questionable stra-
tegic value. This is also true for Brazil’s costly voluntary choice to host the
Olympic Games. As noted above, the games are an extravagant expen-
diture that demonstrates the host’s ability to organize and pay for grand
public displays. Similarly, countries that seek leadership positions often
need to accept a handicap. In a study of leadership in climate- change gov-
ernance, for example, Van der Heijden and Moxnes ( 2013 ) find that would-
be leaders had to adopt costly domestic carbon-reduction policies. This
study demonstrates that leaders are more successful when they accept a
heavier cost. In this sense, an aging aircraft carrier, playing host to the
summer games, or accepting leadership positions in international gover-
nance are akin to the peacock’s tail: all are voluntary handicaps made
explicable through the logic of costly signals. In fact, the more expensive,
exclusive, ostentatious, and luxurious the handicap, the more effective the
signal it sends. In all these cases, the actors signal that they have enough
resources to satisfy their basic needs and to pay for luxuries.
At the extreme end, the most effective costly signals will involve an
active destruction of one’s own property. Such examples do exist. In the
Pacific Northwest, intertribal hierarchy was largely established through
