explaining conspicuous consumption 21
separate themselves from these patterns by adopting unique tastes. For a
bandwagoner, an increase in aggregate consumption of some good creates
positive externalities, whereas for a snob, the externalities of wider con-
sumption of a good are negative. When an item becomes fashionable, the
bandwagoner is more likely to consume it. Conversely, the more fashion-
able an item becomes, the less appealing it is for the snob. Veblen effects
refer to the aforementioned phenomena of conspicuous consumption.
Here, the effect is driven by the price of the good rather than by the level
of its aggregate consumption. Accordingly, Veblen effects look at the “ex-
tent to which the demand for a commodity is increased because it bears a
higher rather than lower price tag” (Liebenstein 1950 , 189 ).^41
Brazil’s carrier purchase is an example of both snob and Veblen effects.
The implications of a snob effect are quite straightforward. The purchase
was attractive for Brazil because so few countries own carriers. Only ten
other countries in the world, most of them major powers, own aircraft
carriers.^42 Moreover, the fact that Brazil would become the only country
in Latin America to own a carrier made the purchase more salient and
hence more attractive, especially after Argentina was forced to give up its
old carrier because of the heavy operation and maintenance costs. The
implications of a Veblen effect are less intuitive but equally important.
A higher price point enhances the strength of the consumption signal. A
Veblenian analysis thus suggests that the high cost of the carrier contrib-
uted to its attractiveness to Brazil. By and large, other things being equal,
a higher price contributes to an item’s exclusivity and to its conspicuous-
ness, making it more desirable. The combination of snob and Veblen ef-
fects made the carrier purchase an appealing target of conspicuous con-
sumption for Brazil. More generally, price alone will not always suffice as
an effective status signal unless it is accompanied by elements of the snob
effect. Consequently, throughout this volume, the application of conspicu-
ous consumption to international relations treats both effects in tandem.
Conspicuous consumption, as in the purchase of a luxury good rather
than a necessity, almost always involves a dimension of waste. After all,
there are cheaper ways to satisfy hunger than by eating caviar and more
economical ways of commuting to work than driving a Rolls Royce. Veb-
len, therefore, alternates between the terms conspicuous consumption
and conspicuous waste and uses them interchangeably. For him, it is the
wasteful dimension of conspicuous consumption that turns it into a truly
costly (and therefore credible) signal. This waste is akin to the voluntary
handicap accepted by Zahavi and Zahavi’s peacock. For the peacock, the
