The Price of Prestige

28 chapter one

to be particularly impressed by acts of conspicuous consumption, even

when they clearly hold very little substance, and to be less impressed by

inconspicuous acts, even when these have more potency. This is expected

to be the case even when there is complete information regarding both

conspicuous and inconspicuous acts. Traditional theories of international

relations fail to provide a persuasive account of conspicuousness. Hence,

by demonstrating that such a preference exists in international relations,

we can establish one piece of suggestive evidence for the existence of Veb-

len effects.

3. hierarchy. Prestige is social, hierarchical, and positional. Social hier-

archy is, therefore, a fundamental component of the Veblenian approach.

Improving or securing one’s position in the social international hierarchy

is the main motivation of conspicuous consumers. Hence, we can assume

that the position of an actor within this social hierarchy matters and is

likely to have behavioral implications. Actors who wish to be regarded as

great powers must behave as great powers. Great powers need constantly

to differentiate themselves from the rest of the crowd in order to maintain

their privileged position. Their location in the system is likely to induce

behavior qualitatively different from the behavior of those located else-

where in the social hierarchy. The same would be true of every class of ac-

tors all the way down to the bottom of the social ladder. As we move up and

down the social ladder we should observe different commodity bundles.

Actors that experience a change in their social fortunes will adjust by de-

veloping a taste for a different combination of goods suitable for their new

social station.

4. cycles of status symbols. When a specific act of conspicuous con-

sumption is used with regularity as a means of establishing actors’ rela-

tive position in a hierarchy, it becomes a status symbol (Goffman 1951 ;

Dittmar 1992 ). Once such symbols are institutionalized, they are coveted

by all who wish to be considered members of the club those symbols are

thought to represent. We can therefore expect such symbols to be attrac-

tive targets for pecuniary emulation and invidious comparison. The inter-

play between these conflicting patterns of consumption leads to continu-

ous instability, if not in the distribution of prestige then at least in the

choice of symbols. Once too many “emulators” gain access to a certain

status symbol, an observer can no longer differentiate between legitimate

members of that social class and those who carry “fake ID cards.” Those

who wish to separate themselves from the “illegitimate” newcomers would