the aircraft carrier club 67
those are really needed. Hence, we should expect models that emphasize
material functionalism to work best when explaining consumption pat-
terns of expensive goods. The theory of conspicuous consumption, on the
other hand, predicts the opposite. Because the consumption of inexpen-
sive items cannot generate an effective test of status, those goods would be
consumed only when needed. Expensive items, on the other hand, could
serve as attractive venues for conspicuous consumption, and therefore their
acquisition patterns should be more loosely correlated with functional
reasoning. Thus, for example, according to this argument, the procure-
ment of fast attack crafts, small and relatively cheap vessels, should be
more significantly affected by strategic variables than the procurement of
cruisers.
Finally, a rational actor is likely to be deterred only by capabilities that
may inflict costs on her in case of conflict. Capabilities that would play
no role in an expected confrontation should have little effect on the cost-
benefit calculations of the actors. For example, a land power, planning a
land offensive against its neighbors, may not be easily deterred by a mari-
time power, even if the latter has superior maritime capabilities. In this
example maritime capabilities are not directly relevant to the protection of
the disputed asset. Mearsheimer ( 1986 ) claims that this is one of the rea-
sons behind the failure of British deterrence in both world wars. Germany
did not view the British navy as a deterrent because naval power had a
marginal functional role in any expected land campaign in Western Eu-
rope. Deterrence thus assumes a relatively narrow functional relationship
between the capabilities developed by the actors and their potential use in
a future conflict.
The concept of conspicuous consumption, on the other hand, chal-
lenges this tight functional relationship between the acquisition of new
capabilities and strategic need. Actors may continue to develop capabili-
ties that have very little to do with the requirements of deterrence. In fact,
paradoxically, these are the types of capabilities that would attract the
greatest amount of attention and prestige. A weak functional justification
combined with a high price tag transforms the development of such capa-
bilities into a form of luxury that can effectively signal actors’ status. The
more tenuous the functional dimension of consumption and the more
expensive it is, the more it can be viewed as a luxury good. Indeed, when an
object becomes a status symbol, we often observe a persistent mismatch
between its design and the strategic needs it is supposed to fulfill. Such
mismatches have been an almost consistent facet of naval procurement.
