72 chapter three
The purchase of the São Paulo came at a time of great financial dif-
ficulties for the Brazilian armed forces. The Brazilian army, for example,
had to discharge forty thousand recruits before the end of their training
because of budget shortages (Proença et al. 2003 ). In 1999 , a year before
the carrier deal, a lack of money led to the grounding of most Brazilian
combat aircraft (Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 29 , 1999 , 27 ).^14 Follow-
ing the carrier purchase, the navy had to postpone the nuclear submarine
project it had been developing for three decades and order a complete
restructuring of its resources.^15
The discrepancy between Brazil’s strategic interests, financial capabili-
ties, and naval procurement policy is striking. Proença et al. ( 2003 ) ques-
tion the utility of the Brazilian carrier because it lacks the necessary escort
of a carrier group or the logistical support that could enable power pro-
jection. Antonio Carlos Pereira ( 2000 ), a prominent Brazilian journalist,
voices similar concerns.
The main purpose of a carrier such as Foch is power projection, yet Brazil has
no international commitments that necessitate such capabilities. To accomplish
missions of sea control — a true necessity of our defense policy — this carrier
would be insufficient.... A less costly combination of long- range aircraft, sub-
marines and battleships could handle that mission with more efficiency.... One
carrier will be nothing more than a training facility, because, from an opera-
tional point- of- view, the old saying is still valid: he who has one carrier, has
none; he who has two, has half a carrier; he who has three, may have one. The
Malvinas / Falkland War between Argentina and England provides us with a
good example: having just one carrier, Argentina had to leave it anchored in a
protected cove, away from the hostilities, where the aging carrier would have
been an easy prey to British submarines.^16