46 Europe The EconomistNovember 2nd 2019
2 As Richard Schröder, a former East German
dissident, notes, the application of west-
ern laws and practices saw off the threat of
oligarchic corruption that has plagued
many of Germany’s eastern neighbours.
Yet if east Germans do not always appre-
ciate their good fortune, it is because their
reference points have been Hamburg and
Munich, not Bratislava or Budapest. Im-
plicit in the promise of reunification was a
pledge that east Germans could finally en-
joy what they had so long envied in the
west. For years they were forced to witness
a lifestyle that remained out of reach, in the
packets of coffee and sweets sent by rela-
tives in the west, the western goods on dis-
play in Intershop outlets accessible only to
those with hard currency, or the commer-
cials on western television beamed across
the border. In 1990 Chancellor Kohl prom-
ised east Germans “blooming landscapes”.
Instead they got deindustrialisation and
mass unemployment. “In 1990 300,000
people came to shout ‘Helmut!’ on Augus-
tusplatz [in Leipzig],” recalls Kurt-Ulrich
Mayer, who helped establish Kohl’s Chris-
tian Democratic Union (cdu) in Saxony.
“Four years later he came back, and we
needed umbrellas to protect him from all
the eggs and tomatoes.” Unlike Poles or
Hungarians, east Germans had someone
else to blame when things went wrong.
The convergence between west and east
eventually ground to a halt. Today just 7%
of Germany’s most-valued 500 companies
(and none listed in the dax30 index) are
headquartered in the east. This starves mu-
nicipalities of tax revenue and contributes
to the east-west productivity gap, which
has stood at around 20% for 20 years. Most
assets liquidated by the Treuhand fell into
western or foreign hands, hindering the
development of an eastern capitalist class.
For many, the best way to get western
lifestyles was to move west. Over one-quar-
ter of east Germans aged 18-30 did so, two-
thirds of them women. Rural parts of the
east were especially affected. As towns and
villages emptied and tax revenues
slumped, schools were closed, shops shut-tered and housing blocks demolished. The
mass emigration of youngsters led to a
plummeting number of births. Since 2017
net east-west migration has been roughly
zero, but there has been no growth in the
number of people moving east; the west-
ward exodus has simply fallen to match it.
The east is also much older than the
west. Since 1990 the number of over-60s
there has increased by 1.3m even as the
overall population has fallen by 2.2m. iwh,
a research outfit in Halle, thinks the work-
ing-age population in the east will fall by
more than a third by 2060. By 2035, 23 of
Germany’s 401Kreise (administrative dis-
tricts) will have shrunk by at least a fifth,
says Susanne Dähner at the Berlin Institute
for Population and Development; all of
them are in the east. In some districts,
there will be four funerals for every birth.
Instead of losing people to the west, east-
ern Germany will lose them to the grave.
The constitutional pledge of “equiva-
lent living conditions” across Germany
thus looks unattainable. The government
tries to help so-called “structurally weak”
regions, in the east as well as the west. But
although investment in infrastructure or
technical universities may help some
towns, it cannot stop the demographic de-
cline in many east German regions.Coming to terms
The picture is much brighter in some east-
ern cities. Potsdam, Jena and Dresden have
clusters of industry and tourism as well as
cheap housing; some, like Leipzig (“Hype-
zig”, to irritated locals), have been booming
for years. The “bacon belt” around Berlin
benefits from the success of the capital, es-
pecially as older workers move out to the
suburbs. Yet even as overall emigration to
the west dries up, eastern cities are sucking
educated people away from already strug-
gling small towns and villages. That trend
may continue, as only half of east German
workers work in cities, compared with
three-quarters in the west.
The changes in the east have social, cul-
tural and political consequences which arenow coming to the fore. Last February
thousands of Dynamo Dresden supporters
at an away game in Hamburg began an un-
familiar chant: “Ost [east], Ost, Ostdeutsch-
land!” A video of the episode went viral,
sparking a lively debate: were the fans ex-
pressing a dubious “eastern” variant of mil-
itant German nationalism? Or was this a
cheerful reappropriation of an identity
that for so long was taken to connote stu-
pidity and closed-mindedness?
“Identity is key to understanding east
Germany,” says Franziska Schubert, a
thoughtful Green who represents Görlitz in
Saxony’s state parliament. Fully 47% of
east Germans say they identify as eastern-
ers before Germans, a far higher proportion
than at the euphoric moment of reunifica-
tion. (The equivalent is true for 22% of
westerners.) Regional identity is hardly ab-
normal in Germany—ask the Bavarians—
but in the east it can seem grounded in pol-
itics as much as culture or tradition.
When Jana Hensel, a writer, recently
gave a talk to a school in her home town of
Leipzig, she was astonished to find herself
spending half an hour fielding questions
from teenagers about an Ossiquote(a pro-
posal to give east Germans preference in
public jobs). “More than 25 years after the
end of the gdr, students have become east
German again,” she says. “If we’re not care-
ful, we’ll lose another generation.”
The afdhas exploited the power of east-
ern particularism. Under slogans like “The
east rises up!” the party has scored 20%-
plus in eastern state elections, most re-
cently in Thuringia on October 27th. There,
and in recent elections in Brandenburg and
Saxony, it was only voters over 60 whose
support for the established parties ensured
that the afddid not come first. In Saxony
and Thuringia the afdwas the most popu-
lar party among under-30s. This is worry-
ing in a part of the country where extrem-
ism has found fertile ground. More than
half of Germany’s hate crimes take place in
the east, though it has just 20% of the pop-
ulation and few immigrants.
But eastern identity is not the exclusive
preserve of extremes. Many young eastern-
ers simply developed an “Ossi” identity
after encountering ignorance or scorn in
the west. Nor need it be only negative. Mat-
thias Platzeck, a former Brandenburg pre-
mier now in charge of a commission for the
30th anniversary of reunification, says that
the recent election in his state was the
worst-tempered ever. Nonetheless, he
hopes for the emergence in the east of
healthy self-confidence, built on the back
of success stories—and a new focus on the
many problems that span east and west.
His commission’s informal motto, he says,
is “as little state celebration as necessary, as
much discussion as possible.” And since
the Berlin Wall has gone, no amount of de-
bate will land anyone in jail. 7Plenty to cheer*ExcludesBerlin
†WorldBankest.pre 1993Sources:HalleInstituteforEconomic
Research;IMF;WorldBankGDP per person, 1991=100501001502002503001991 95 2000 05 10 15 18West
Germany*East Germany*PolandBulgaria HungaryCzech Rep.†The productivity problem
GDP per employee
Germany=100Source:HalleInstituteforEconomicResearch, 2019EastGermany
( includingBerlin)WestGermany10052000951991 17120100806040