48 Europe The EconomistNovember 2nd 2019
L
arge, blueand furry, the bulging-eyed Brexit monster has been
spooking Rotterdam for months. Launched ahead of Britain’s
scheduled exit from the euin March, the monster is the mascot of
government efforts to brace the Netherlands for the rupture. These
have been especially intense at Europe’s busiest port, which han-
dles 40m tonnes of trade with Britain annually. Leaflets showing
the monster blocking goods have been distributed to truckers as
part of preparations that include creating giant lorry parks, hiring
hundreds of staff and obliging firms to register their cargos. Thrice
the Brexit monster has haunted the port. Thrice leaders in Brussels
have agreed to delays as deadlock has dragged on in London. “Ef-
fective from today, the buffer parking locations for trucks will
again be dismantled,” announced managers, teeth almost audibly
gritted, after the latest postponement on October 28th.
They are not the only ones to feel mucked around. The Dutch
are traditionally among London’s closest euallies. Though dis-
traught at the Brexit vote—many hoped that Britain would change
its mind—they remained initially well-disposed. Your columnist
accompanied Theresa May, then prime minister, on her inaugural
trip to The Hague in 2016. “My new British colleague!” gushed Mark
Rutte, the Dutch prime minister. “So happy to see you!” The good-
will and hopes for a friendly Brexit have since vanished. Earlier
this year Mr Rutte compared Mrs May to the dismembered knight
in a British comedy sketch who deludedly insists his injuries are
“but a scratch”. He seems to have little more respect for Boris John-
son. “He can hardly hide the fact he thinks the English are stupid,”
observes Theodor Holman, a Dutch commentator.
The euis exasperated with Britain. The Brexit process has
dragged on longer than expected and consumed time the euneeds
for other things. Mr Rutte joined Emmanuel Macron last week in
pushing for the next delay to be short and, ideally, final. Other
leaders prevailed and Britain was given until the end of January.
But patience is wearing thin across the union. On October 29th Do-
nald Tusk, the outgoing president of the European Council,
tweeted ominously: “The eu27 has formally adopted the exten-
sion. It may be the last one.” A common refrain in The Hague and
other capitals is that whatever the form of Brexit—soft, hard or no-
deal—it would now be better to have done with it. Europeans hopethat Britain’s election in December will deliver this certainty and
fret about another hung parliament or, later, a second Brexit refer-
endum failing to deliver a clear majority for any one course.
“Good riddance” seems to be the prevailing continental mood.
The euis utterly fed up of the Brexit talks and has stuck to its tough
and united line on Brexit; determined not to let Britain leave with a
deal better than membership that could boost Eurosceptic popu-
lists elsewhere. Both of these things can give the impression that
the union is resigned to a weakening of its links with Britain. But it
is not. For the fundamentals go beyond the current political mire.
The Netherlands sums them up. The same Dutch officials who
moan about Britain also miss its support as part of the eu’s bloc of
frugal, northern eumember states. The Dutch economy remains
closely integrated with the British one, with big firms like Unilever
and Shell spanning the North Sea and huge flows of goods and ser-
vices between the coasts. Although the Netherlands benefits from
the exodus of firms quitting London for cities like Amsterdam and
Rotterdam, its leaders fret about the competitive threat of an off-
shore Britain that undercuts European regulatory standards. They
also worry about a post-Brexit Britain’s geopolitical divergence
and the spectre of one of Europe’s few serious security powers piv-
oting towards Donald Trump’s America or China. “The Germans
don’t bring strategic focus, and the French are running their own
show. There is no-one to fill the space left by the Brits,” says Rem
Korteweg of the Clingendael Institute. Similar concerns also
bother European leaders elsewhere. Britain needs a friendly eu
and the euneeds a friendly Britain.Love the sinner, hate the sin
All of which points to four eventualities that are more likely than
they look in the current tetchy cross-Channel political environ-
ment. First, as much fresh despair as a new British request to delay
again in January would create, it is unlikely that the euor any indi-
vidual leader in it would want to be held responsible for a no-deal
exit; the euwould probably approve a nerve-grinding fourth ex-
tension if the alternative were a disorderly departure. Second, the
euwill do all it can in negotiations about its future relationship
with Britain to keep ties close, adopting a highly conciliatory tone
on security and defence co-operation in particular, and trying hard
to prevent Britain from diverging far on regulation.
Third, for all the continentals’ frustration and the Brexiteers’
hopes of a British rapprochement with America, the two sides may
be pushed back together if Mr Trump is re-elected. Finally, the eu’s
door will never be firmly closed to a Britain that changes its mind
about Brexit—before or after its departure.
Taken together, these principles point to a conclusion as seem-
ingly improbable as it is inexorable: the momentum does not nec-
essarily favour divergence; perhaps quite the opposite. Britain and
continental Europe may end up closer, in some form, in the future
than looks likely now.
Which is not, by any means, to say that Brexit is a good idea. The
forces of political, security and economic reality pushing Britain
and continental Europe together are all arguments for Britain to
stay in the club and pursue its interests from within. The painful
and inconclusive Brexit process to date has only made those forces
clearer; Brexit has been hard for a reason. Figures on both sides of
the Channel—hard Brexiteers and continental Anglo-sceptics—
may dream of a simple solution, of a “clean break” allowing both
sides to get on and pursue their own separate paths. The reality was
never that simple. It never will be. 7Charlemagne The magnetic field
Britain and the eumay remain closer than the Brexit mire suggests