24 | New Scientist | 9 November 2019
Views You r le t te r s
Editor’s pick
We must deal with the
roots of domestic violence
19 October, p 20
From Ann Bliss, London, UK
I was interested by Alice Klein’s
article on domestic violence and
ways to tackle it. During the 1980s,
I worked in a women’s refuge, then
one of two in my London borough.
This essential service for vulnerable
women and their children has
since been cut as a result of the
government’s reduction of financial
support to local authorities.
The male-dominated police
and judiciary still don’t understand
or take seriously the physical,
psychological and emotional
damage that the fear and actuality
of domestic violence and abuse
cause, not just to victims – who
are, as Klein says, overwhelmingly
women – but also to their children.
Women need to feel empowered
and supported to resist abuse by
promoting a culture of respect, both
in the home and in schools. Children
who witness domestic violence may
come to believe that this is the norm
within families and repeat the
patterns as adults. By all means
support men to prevent further
abuse, but it is more important
to provide support for women by
empowering them and providing
refuges so that they and their
children have a safe place to run to.
Until we accept that we live in a
patriarchal, misogynist culture and
overthrow this system, very little
systemic change will happen.The editor writes:
For more on the origins of patriarchy,
see 21 April 2018, page 33.Eco-anxiety is just anxiety
and may merit treatment
12 October, p 22
From Philip Belben,
Nettlebridge, Somerset, UK
Graham Lawton makes some good
points about the alleged condition
of eco-anxiety. But in getting from
these to his conclusions, he takes a
strange route. At first, he seems tobe generalising from his own
experience: because his anxiety
is rational, so is that of everyone
else. This may give the impression,
though, that eco-anxiety is
something specific and different
from other forms of anxiety.
Surely the reason not to classify
eco-anxiety as a mental illness is
that it isn’t a special case. People
react emotionally to situations,
sometimes by becoming anxious.
This anxiety may be rational or
it may not. Anxiety about climate
change covers this whole range.
If someone needs treatment
for an inappropriate response, this
must not be obscured by a notion
that eco-anxiety is always rational,
any more than by the idea that
it is a specific mental condition
that is somehow different from
other forms of anxiety.
Children often have incomplete
models to assess what response
is appropriate, and can thus
suffer from irrational fears.
The current climate emergency,
impinging so hugely on all our
lives, may well be the trigger for
some of these. This is neither
a new phenomenon that needs
a new name nor a non-existent
one to be dismissed.We have proposals for
regulating animal work12 October, p 18
From Hope Ferdowsian,
Albuquerque, New Mexico, US
We need a clear ethical framework
for animal research, says Chelsea
Whyte. Protections for human
research provide a template.
In 1979, the Belmont Report,
issued following the US National
Research Act (1974), revolutionised
research on human subjects by
articulating key ethical principles:
specifically, respect for autonomy
and obligations to beneficence
and justice. Such research now
requires informed consent, a
full assessment of the risks and
benefits, and the just selection of
participants. Vulnerable groups,
including children and prisoners,
have special protection.
In an article in the Cambridge
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics,
my colleagues and I envision
an equivalent for animals that
considers concepts like autonomy,
justice and vulnerability to harm
(doi.org/dc9m). We describe how
animals could be treated as
vulnerable subjects, with greater
attention to the potential harmsthey experience before, during
and after proposed experiments.
This includes separation from
loved ones, confinement and
the infliction of painful, deadly
procedures and diseases.
We argue for a stricter risk
threshold that recognises animals’
status as a vulnerable population.
We also describe new ways forward
including more ethical, human-
centred research methods and
re-envisioning animal research
as more akin to human clinical
research – for example, enrolment
of “animal patients” who live with
“surrogate” human caregivers.
Animals overwhelmingly bear
the burdens of research, despite
their inability to provide informed
consent or to benefit from it. This
is a decidedly unjust proposition.
Public concern, backed by our
current understanding of animals,
demands better.Consciousness may be
just a model of attention
21 September, p 34
From Markus Eymann,
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Michael Graziano suggests our
brains have evolved something