2019-11-09_The_Economist

36 Asia The EconomistNovember 9th 2019

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Banyan Islands in a steam

T

his weekthe president of the Micro-

nesian state of Kiribati, Taneti Maa-

mau, lost his governing majority when 13

of his mps crossed the floor. The defec-

tors claim they are unhappy that in

September the atoll nation of 110,000

souls, spread over 3.5m km^2 of the south

Pacific, severed diplomatic ties with

Taiwan and initiated them with China

instead. Something similar may be about

to happen in the more populous Solo-

mon Islands. Its government has also

just switched allegiance to China. The

opposition reckons that it will soon be

able to peel off eight government mps to

win a vote of no-confidence over the

decision. If so, it would be the fourth

time Manasseh Sogavare has been un-

seated as prime minister. His latest stint

in the job began only in April.

Why such instability? Don’t overplay

the China factor. Mr Maamau complains

the defectors never even raised their

grievances with him. In the Solomon

Islands, China hardly featured in the

election campaign earlier this year. That,

of course, is one of the reasons pro-

Taiwan mps are crying foul. But relations

with China have not destabilised two

governments in the region because they

are a burning issue. It just does not take

much to destabilise Pacific governments.

In the Solomon Islands, only a single

government has survived a full term, and

that was under the auspices of ramsi, an

Australian-led international policing

mission that concluded in 2017. Especial-

ly in the Melanesian states of Papua New

Guinea (png), the Solomon Islands and

Vanuatu, governments are plagued by

chronic instability. Ministers show little

loyalty. The business of government is

driven by the exigencies of holding

together fragile coalitions.

After each general election in the

Solomon Islands, a “second election” takes

place as mps establish camps in the main

hotels in the capital, Honiara, and wait for

offers of ministerial portfolios or “refund

of campaign expenditures”. Parties lack

discipline (and policies). Mr Sogavare’s

Ownership, Unity and Responsibility

(our) Party had little force or numbers this

year until the second election. At times

like this “yo-yo” politicians, the most

opportunist or feckless, can exert great

influence, as can the logging companies

who often bankroll rival factions. Nor does

it take much to whip up an angry mob. One

trashed the hotel in which Mr Sogavare

was forming a government in 2006.

ourParty’s discipline is about to be

tested. Ministers and mps are miffed, the

opposition claims, that the 2m Solomon

dollars ($242,000) they were each alleged-

ly supposed to receive two days after the

switch to China has not materialised. That

will help the opposition in the no-confi-

dence vote, although a majority that relies

on yo-yos is always fragile.

In many respects, the instability is

unsurprising. The Solomon Islands was

never quite the failed state that Austra-

lian politicians claimed when ramsiwas

set up. But it has always been a thread-

bare one, with weak institutions and

feeble central authority. The country is

extraordinarily diverse, with 70 lan-

guages spoken across a swathe of often

thickly forested islands. Many of its 50

parliamentary constituencies are rural

and remote. Party affiliation is irrele-

vant—more important are promises of

corrugated iron for roofs. When mps

move to Honiara, they take pains to

conceal their mobile number from wan-

toks(“one-talks”—people who speak the

same language or come from the same

place) to ward off endless requests for

financial assistance.

Both the Solomon Islands and png

have adopted laws to strengthen party

discipline and thus end instability. They

have backfired. In pngthey encouraged a

proliferation of microparties; in the

Solomon Islands politicians simply

adjusted by running as independents.

Perhaps Westminster-style parliamenta-

ry systems simply don’t fit the region,

many conclude.

Here, Kiribati is an outlier. First, it has

a presidential rather than a parliament-

ary system. Moreover, if the president is

removed from office by parliament,

parliament is dissolved too. That will

make mps think twice before booting out

Mr Maamau.

Yet elsewhere democracy stumbles

on. It helps that judiciaries are usually

independent and the press uncon-

strained. Would-be authoritarians, Mr

Sogavare among them, struggle to retain

power in the face of the threat of defec-

tion and resistance to central authority.

As bad as the constant churn is for Pacific

democracies, a more authoritarian sys-

tem is unlikely to be any better.

Why politics in the south Pacific are so precarious

elections on January 11th, in which Ms Tsai

is seeking a second term. The Chinese au-

thorities probably did want to present a

friendlier face, having appalled many Tai-

wanese with their intransigent response to

pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong and

with their ongoing efforts to win over the

few remaining countries that have dip-

lomatic relations with Taiwan. But they are

also conscious that China is not quite as al-

luring a destination for Taiwanese firms as

it used to be.

Although Taiwanese firms still invest

more in China than anywhere else, the

sums involved have fallen sharply in re-

cent years (see chart on previous page).

China accounted for 84% of Taiwan’s for-

eign investment in 2010. In the first nine

months of this year, that had fallen to

34%. The rising cost of labour in China had

already led Taiwanese manufacturers of

mundane goods like umbrellas and shoes

to move their factories to South-East Asia.

Now the trade war between America and

China has prompted tech firms to recon-

sider their investment strategy. Taiwanese

officials say that 151 Taiwanese companies

operating in China have returned home

this year, with plans to invest $20.5bn. Jay

Chen of Academia Sinica, a state research

institute in Taiwan, doubts the 26 sweeten-

ers will reverse the trend.

The Mainland Affairs Council argues

that last year’s 31 measures and related fol-

low-ups were badly implemented. For in-

stance, although Taiwanese were theoreti-

cally granted the same access to services as

mainlanders if they had lived in China for

six months, many still found it difficult to

obtain a local credit card. Taiwanese often

remark that living in China tends to make

their compatriots more patriotic. 7