THE SEVEN DAYS BATTLES
The Seven Days Battles drove the Union
army back 20 miles (32km), lifting the
threat to Richmond and ensuring that
McClellan’s campaign ended in failure.
CONFEDERATE STRATEGY
Lee had not demonstrated masterly generalship in
the Seven Days Battles. He admitted: “Our success
has not been as great or as complete as we should
have desired.” But he had set up a moral
supremacy over the Union army, aiming to keep
up the initiative. As soon as his own army had
recovered, he marched it north of Richmond.
Lee counted on McClellan remaining
inactive, which he did. The Army of the
Potomac dug in defensively at Harrison’s
Landing under the protection of naval guns.
While continuing to demand reinforcements,
McClellan did not resume the offensive. In
August he reluctantly obeyed orders to ship
the Army of the Potomac back to
Washington to assist in the fighting in
northern Virginia 120–21 ❯❯.
McClellan’s response to having won
this tactical victory was to order his
men to withdraw from the positions
they had so determinedly held, to
higher ground behind a swamp. Still
convinced he would be assaulted by
large numbers of Confederates, he also
set about shifting his supply base to the
James River. Lee, however, was
determined to continue his offensive.
Lee’s victory at Gaines’ Mill
Pursuing the retreating enemy the next
day, Lee came up against the Union
army’s new defensive line at Gaines’
Mill. Once again, coordination between
Lee’s subordinates failed and A. P. Hill’s
division took heavy casualties, fighting
alone for much of the afternoon. Late
in the day Brigadier General John Bell
Hood’s tough Texan brigade pierced the
Union center with a charge in which
every officer but Hood himself was
killed or wounded. The Union forces
withdrew, leaving the Confederates
victorious but at a heavy cost, losing
around 9,000 men. While this brutal
contest took place on its right flank, the
majority of the Union army remained
inactive, more than 60,000 men being
kept out of the fight.
McClellan’s rage
After Gaines’ Mill, McClellan lost his
nerve. Despite his superior forces, he
retreated toward Harrison’s Landing on
the James River, convinced that he was
saving his army from imminent
destruction and firing off angry
telegrams to Washington blaming the
government for the debacle.
Lee pursued his adversary
ruthlessly, seeking to land a decisive
blow, but repeatedly failed. His
ambitious orders for coordinated
maneuvers to outflank and trap Union
forces proved beyond the capacity
of his subordinates. Jackson was
unusually sluggish, singularly failing to
master the speed and
decisiveness he had shown
in the Shenandoah Valley
campaign. At Savage’s
Station on June 29, the
Union rearguard escaped
ruin because Jackson
was slow crossing the
Chickahominy River.
Yet Lee saw a prime
opportunity the next day
as much of the Army of
the Potomac struggled
along congested roads
between White Oak
Swamp and Glendale. The
Confederate commander
was determined to
bring all his forces
to bear in a
climactic battle, but
divisions lost their way or
were stuck on blocked roads.
Jackson, ordered to attack from
the north across White Oak
Swamp, failed to join in, even when
fighting broke out within earshot of
his position. Only two divisions, under
Longstreet and A. P. Hill, attacked the
Yankees, who put up stiff resistance
despite failing to form a proper
defensive line. Casualties on both sides
were heavy and the result indecisive.
Bloodshed at Malvern Hill
Meanwhile, McClellan withdrew to
the safety of the ironclad USS Galena
off shore, leaving effective command
to Brigadier General Fitz
John Porter. Most of the
retreating Army of the
Potomac concentrated in a
formidable defensive position
on Malvern Hill. Flanked by
ravines, it could only be
assaulted from the front by
troops advancing up a slope
and across an open plain. The
Union artillery unlimbered
its cannons and waited for
the enemy to show.
Lee guessed that the
Union soldiers were demoralized and
would crack if put under pressure. He
devised a plan for his artillery to open
holes in the Union line for his infantry
to exploit. But everything went wrong.
The Confederate guns could not be
moved forward in sufficient strength
and faired poorly in the artillery duel.
Next, Lee’s infantry assaults began
piecemeal as men stormed forward
singly and were shot down by shrapnel,
canister, and grapeshot. Those few units
that reached the Union lines were
driven back by counterattacks. The
following day, McClellan again ordered
a Union withdrawal, but Lee did not
pursue and the fighting ended.
AFTER
“The soul of the brave general was fit to burst
for the awful and useless sacrifice.”
CAPTAIN MOXLEY SORREL OF MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD EWELL AFTER MALVERN HILL
Union casualties
The Battle of Gaines’ Mill on June 27 saw thousands of
Union casualties. Many of the wounded were transferred
by flatbed rail cars to a Northern field hospital at Savage’s
Station. When the Confederates attacked the site on June
29 the hospital was abandoned and the patients captured.
Medal of Honor
The award of the Medal of Honor for
conspicuous bravery was instituted for the
Union Army in 1862. This one was awarded
to Brigadier General Daniel Butterfield for his
“distinguished gallantry” at Gaines’ Mill.
HARRISON’S LANDING
The number of Southern
casualties at the Battle
of Malvern Hill on July 1, 1862. In total,
the Confederacy lost 20,204 soldiers in
the Seven Days Battles, compared with
15,855 losses for the Union Army.
5,400
The closest
McClellan’s Army
of the Potomac came to Richmond
during the Peninsula Campaign.
9 MILES