The Economist

32 United States The EconomistAugust 4th 2018

A

ONCE-popular argument that President Donald Trump’s ap-

proach to foreign policy is not substantiallydifferent from Ba-

rack Obama’s is going down in a blaze of trade agreements. Yet on

Afghanistan it remains broadly true. Mr Obama came to power

describing Afghanistan’s conflict as the “war we have to win” but

never seemed convinced that that was possible. After a stab at es-

calating the conflict he devoted his presidency to ending it. It was

time he said in 2011 the year the war became the longest in Amer-

ican history “to focus on nation-building here at home.” Mr

Trump has long said the same. His decision to launch a much

smaller escalation last year came with the closest thing he can

muster to an apology attached: “My original instinct was to pull

out and historically I like to follow my instincts.” Even so his re-

cord on Afghanistan including this week a promise of peace talks

to add to that modest military reinforcement is starting to look

much better than his predecessor’s.

This chiefly reflects what a low bar Mr Obama set. Reluctantly

persuaded that withdrawal from Afghanistan would spell defeat

as the Taliban rushed to seize the territory vacated by over

100000 Western troops Mr Obama left 8000 behind to hold the

line. But with the Taliban controlling or contesting 70% of the

country the largely incompetent Afghan army flailing and the

Americans bound by strict rules of engagement it was unclear

how they could. At the request of his generals who may fear the

strategic impact of defeat in Afghanistan as much as the prospect

of it again falling into the handsof foreign terrorists MrTrump

grudgingly agreed to send 3500 reinforcements. He also relaxed

the rules and increased American air strikes military trainers and

mentoring of front-line Afghan troops. He presented these

changes as a rebuke to his predecessor. They might alternatively

be seen as an acceptance of Mr Obama’s shrivelled ambition—to

stave off defeat in Afghanistan until the Afghan government can

fend for itself—and a modest attempt to make that achievable.

Unsurprisingly then Mr Trump’s measures have not trans-

formed the battlefield where the Taliban remain in the ascen-

dant. Instead of encouraging the Afghan government to take back

territory America is reported to be urging it to withdraw from re-

mote outposts to reduce casualties. The level of violence contin-

ues to be horrifying especially among civilians. More were killed

in the first six months of this year than in any previous year on re-

cord in part because of increased American bombing. Yet there is

at least more confidence that the Taliban can be prevented from

taking a major town. And the 315000-strong Afghan armed

forces are said to be improving. Compared with the debacle Mr

Trump inherited this represents progress.

Revelations that a senior American diplomat Alice Wells met

Taliban representatives in Qatar last month are also encouraging.

America and its Afghan ally have been keen to negotiate with the

insurgents since the demise of Mr Obama’s short-lived surge con-

firmed their inability to end the war militarily. But they have gen-

erally insisted thatthe government must lead that effort. Mean-

while the Taliban to underline that their foremost demand is the

withdrawal of foreign troops say they will only speak to Ameri-

ca. It is therefore notable that Ms Wells’s meeting appears to have

taken place without any Afghan official present. That represents

an overdue acknowledgment by America that the Taliban are for-

midable enough to set negotiating terms. It also implies an admis-

sion that America is not merely the benevolent instrument of Af-

ghans’ democratic will it claims to be but an independent actor

in a multi-layered civil conflict whose continued presence in Af-

ghanistan is a legitimate subject of debate.

This is still a far cry from offering Mr Trump a way out. Stitched

together by British imperialists in the late 19th century Afghani-

stan’s feuding ethnic groups have never shared power uncoerced

and 40 years of on-off civil war have made them even more reluc-

tant to. The government is deeply divided along ethnic lines. It is

hard to imagine how its members might accommodate the Tali-

ban—even if they want to be accommodated. It is unclear that the

mullahs have given up on a military victory. It is even unclear

which faction of the Taliban the fundamentalist leadership or

the more pragmatic rump their representatives in Qatar might

speak for. If Mr Trump does view the putative talks as a means to

declare victory and quit Afghanistan as some suspect he has

simply given up on the place.

If the president still wants to avoid that however he can prob-

ably do so indefinitely. The war has cost America a trillion dol-

lars—more in real terms than it spent on rebuilding Europe under

the Marshall Plan—and the lives of 2300 troops. Yet its current

cost—roughly $45bn and around a dozen lives a year—is modest

enough to invite little interest from Congress or the media. That

suggests Mr Trump’s strategy is sustainable.

Hindu koshed by reality

There are many ways it could go wrong nonetheless. Mr Trump’s

perceived success is fragile being largely a reflection of Mr

Obama’s failure. That indicates the degree to which America’s at-

titudes to Afghanistan have always been shaped as much by do-

mestic politics as Afghan reality. The Bush administration demo-

nised the Taliban as terrorists to justify the war on terror. Mr

Obama launched his surge in part because he had long harped

on Afghanistan as a means to criticise the war in Iraq. Mr Trump

launched his mini-surge in partto repudiate Mr Obama. But Af-

ghan reality always asserts itself in the end. The presidential elec-

tion due next year could provoke a crisis that might persuade any

president to wash his hands of the place.

Yet for now something unexpected is happening. Mr Trump is

scoring a modest foreign-policy win where Mr Obama failed

badly. And he is doing so despite sharing his predecessor’s views

on Afghanistan and making only small alterations to his policy. 7

The gift of low expectations

Donald Trump is doing better on Afghanistan than his predecessor

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