Michael O’Hanlon
194 μ¢¤³£ ¬μμ¬
The stationing o U.S. military forces abroad gives additional credence
to this commitment, as any attack on a major ally would likely cause
U.S. casualties, all but guaranteeing a U.S. military response. Today,
Washington’s two principal geopolitical rivals are China and Russia.
China is a rising power that is beginning to challenge the United
States’ economic and technological supremacy, and Russia under Pres-
ident Vladimir Putin has grown more and more dedicated to under-
mining the U.S.-led order. Recognizing the threat posed by Beijing
and Moscow, top defense ocials in both the Obama and the Trump
administrations have emphasized the need for Washington to main-
tain and even strengthen its traditional deterrence strategies.
The question, however, is whether these strategies can credibly de-
ter the sorts o aggression that the United States is likely to face in the
twenty-¿rst century. China and Russia are not Soviet-style superpow-
ers with dreams o world domination; they are revisionist powers that
want to challenge and change aspects o the U.S.-led global order.
There is little chance that China, for instance, would help North Ko-
rea try to invade and conquer South Korea, as it did in the Korean
War. It is more likely to engage in smaller tests o U.S. resolve, such
as seizing from Japan one o the disputed (and unoccupied) islands in
the East China Sea that are known as the Diaoyu in China and the
Senkaku in Japan. Although the United States has formally pledged to
defend these islands, China might suspect that it is unwilling to risk a
great-power war over what are eectively worthless rocks. Yet i Wash-
ington cannot credibly promise to retaliate, extended deterrence has
already failed—and much greater consequences than the loss o one o
the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands could follow.
Doubts about U.S. credibility have been heightened since the elec-
tion o President Donald Trump in 2016. Trump has openly questioned
the value o U.S. alliances and disparaged key U.S. allies. At times, he
has challenged the logic o extended deterrence directly: in July 2018,
he expressed bewilderment that the United States’ obligation to de-
fend Montenegro, a £¬¡¢ member, could lead to World War III. In
addition to emboldening U.S. adversaries, such rhetoric runs the risk
o undermining Washington’s ability to reassure its allies. And the
more that those allies come to doubt the United States’ willingness to
protect them, the more pressured they will be to provide for their own
security, potentially leading to nuclear proliferation and an increased
risk o preemptive or preventive war, among other consequences.