Robert Malley
44 μ¢¤³£ ¬μμ¬
anti-Houthi Äght or get sucked into an
Iranian-Saudi battle. As in Syria, this
eort largely was in vain. The United
States could not cherry-pick one part o
the war: i it was with Saudi Arabia, that
meant it was against the Houthis, which
meant it would be against Iran.WASHINGTON ADRIFT
President Barack Obama’s largely fruitless
attempt to conÄne U.S. involvement in
the region reveals something about the
unavoidable linkages that bind various
Middle Eastern conÁicts together. It also
reveals something about the choices now
facing the United States. Obama (in whose
administration I served) had in mind the
United States’ extrication from what he
considered the broader Middle Eastern
quagmire. He withdrew U.S. troops from
Iraq, tried to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian
conÁict, expressed sympathy for Arab
popular uprisings and for a time dis-
tanced himsel from autocratic leaders,
shunned direct military intervention in
Syria, and pursued a deal with Iran to
prevent its nuclear program from
becoming a trigger for war. Libya doesn’t
Ät this pattern, although even there he
apparently labored under the belie that
the 2011 £¬¡¢-led intervention could be
tightly limited; that this assumption
proved wrong only reinforced his initial
desire to keep his distance from regional
conÁicts. His ultimate goal was to help
the region Änd a more stable balance o
power that would make it less dependent
on direct U.S. interference or protec-
tion. Much to the Saudis’ consternation,
he spoke o Tehran and Riyadh needing
to Änd a way to “share” the region.
But Obama was a gradualist; he was
persuaded that the United States could
neither abruptly nor radically shift gearsStates could not, o course, back rebel
groups while distancing itsel from their
objectives, or claim purely local aims
while everyone else involved saw the
Syrian conÁict in a broader context.
Washington became a central player in a
regional and international game that it
purportedly wanted nothing to do with.
A similar scene has played out in
Yemen. Since 2004, the north o the
country had been the arena o recurring
armed conÁict between the Houthis and
the central government. Government
ocials early on pointed to supposed
Iranian Änancial and military aid to the
rebels, just as Houthi leaders claimed
Saudi interference. After the Houthis
seized the capital and marched southward
in 2014–15, Saudi Arabia—dreading the
prospect o an Iranian-backed militia
controlling its southern neighbor—re-
sponded. Its reaction was magniÄed by
the rise o MBS, who was distrustful o
the United States, determined to show
Iran the days o old were over, and intent
on making his mark at home. Faced with
intense pushback, the Houthis increas-
ingly turned to Iran for military assis-
tance, and Iran, seeing a low-cost oppor-
tunity to enhance its inÁuence and bog
down Saudi Arabia, obliged. Washington,
still in the midst o negotiations over a
nuclear deal with Tehran, which Riyadh
vehemently opposed, felt it could not
aord to add another crisis to the brittle
relations with its Gul ally.
Despite its misgivings about the war,
Washington thus threw its weight behind
the Saudi-led coalition, sharing intelli-
gence, providing weapons, and oering
diplomatic support. As in Syria, the
Obama administration looked to limit
U.S. aims. It would help defend Saudi
territorial integrity but not join Riyadh’s