America’s Great SatanNovember/December 2019 63enormous strains on neighboring coun-
tries—would be even worse.WE CAN WORK IT OUT
Washington and Tehran have rarely
gotten along. Yet Trump’s blanket hostil-
ity toward Iran represents a departure
from the norm o previous presidents.
From the time o the Islamic Revolution,
successive U.S. administrations have had
an ambivalent relationship with Iran.
Publicly, they have often taken a hard
line, suggesting that the country harbors
an immutable enmity for the United
States. In private, however, both Demo-
cratic and Republican administrations
have sought a more pragmatic approach.
None, prior to the Trump administration,
has consistently taken the position that a
working relationship with the clerical
regime is beyond the pale.
This split between public and private
approaches began under Carter. After
the shah Áed Iran in January 1979 and
requested entry into the United States
for medical care, Carter waÔed for
months before Änally admitting him in
October, against the advice o his ambas-
sador in Tehran. Behind the scenes, the
¬ continued to provide the new Iranian
government with sensitive intelligence
until November 1979, when Islamist
students, outraged at Carter’s decision,
seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran. It
was only the hostage crisis, followed by a
botched U.S. attempt to rescue the
hostages in 1980, that Änally convinced
Carter that the revolution had damaged
U.S.-Iranian ties beyond repair.
Even President Ronald Reagan,
canonized for his moral clarity, was
willing to work with Iran when it was
convenient. During Reagan’s Ärst year
and a hal in oce, the United StatesThe current U.S. approach to Iran
also risks driving a wedge between the
United States and Europe. Although the
Europeans have no great love for the
Iranian regime, they prefer negotiation to
conÁict. They are particularly proud o
having helped author the È¢¬, which,
apart from its other virtues, was a master-
piece o complex diplomatic coordina-
tion. The transatlantic disconnect on Iran
reaches back at least to the administration
o U.S. President Bill Clinton, when
Congress voted to impose sanctions on
European companies selling equipment
to Iran’s oil industry. But it has intensiÄed
under Trump. The transatlantic alliance
may not have the same profound strate-
gic importance that it did during the Cold
War, but in an era when both China
and Russia are challenging the West, it
is nonetheless vital. Allowing Iran to
become a sore point between the United
States and Europe would be staggeringly
imprudent.
Finally, U.S.-Iranian antipathy poses a
threat to regional stability. The majority
o states in the Middle East are fragile; in
the past decade alone, two, Libya and
Yemen, have collapsed, and one, Syria, has
come close. The economic, political,
and environmental strains on the region
will only increase over the coming years.
For most states, with the exception o a
few oil monarchies, there is little prospect
o relief. The United States has an
interest in helping these countries hold
together. But its campaign o maximum
pressure on Iran, which is intended to
bankrupt the regime and foster revolu-
tionary conditions, runs precisely counter
to this interest. However distasteful the
current government in Tehran may be,
the consequences o state collapse in
Iran—including a likely refugee crisis and