Sarah Yerkes
72 μ¢¤³£ ¬μμ¬
moribund—and the country with a
broken social contract. For many
Tunisians, the new regime has not
delivered the dignity they demanded in
2010, and as a result, the public distrusts
the new democratic institutions. But
trying to Äx the economy before taking
on the challenge o political reform
could have backÄred, too. There was no
guarantee that once the economy im-
proved, transitional leaders would have
remained committed to democratic
reform. Ultimately, economic challenges
are inevitable during democratic transi-
tions, and the only viable solution may be
for outsiders to provide a stronger safety
net through loan guarantees, budget
support, and foreign direct investment in
the hope o maintaining public support
for democracy.
Tunisia is a beacon o hope for pro-
democracy movements across the Middle
East, but even for the region’s many
autocrats, the country’s successful demo-
cratic transition is more than just a
cautionary tale—for there are worse
fortunes they could face. Ben Ali’s forced
retirement in Saudi Arabia may not strike
them as enviable—but it must certainly
seem preferable to the fates o some who
refused to bow out, be it death at the
hands o insurgents (Libya’s Muammar al-
QaddaÄ); seeing one’s country be
plunged into years o civil war, devasta-
tion, and economic disaster (Syria’s
Bashar al-Assad); or both (Yemen’s Ali
Abdullah Saleh). These divergent fortunes
will loom large in the minds o rulers i
they are faced with mass protests today.
As for the region’s many activists, Tunisia
oers a safe haven that is far more
accessible than Europe or the United
States—and an example o Arab democ-
racy to emulate.∂Young democracies, for their part, can
learn from Tunisia’s brand o consensus
politics. Tunisia’s transition could well
have failed in 2013 had two leaders,
Essebsi and Ghannouchi, not put democ-
racy and pluralism ahead o their own
political ambitions. Budding democratic
leaders are often tempted to fall into
autocratic patterns o behavior and
promote their own agendas by hoarding
power. In the early stages o a democratic
transition, however, leaders need to
share political space and prioritize plural-
ism over exclusion, such that once the
situation has stabilized, there is enough
room for healthy political competition.
Likewise, democracies in the making
should heed the cautionary tale o
Tunisia’s gridlocked Constituent Assem-
bly. For its Ärst three years, the new
government in Tunis operated without a
constitution to guide its actions. And
today, almost six years after the constitu-
tion’s ratiÄcation, much o it has not been
implemented. Several o the bodies it
mandates, such as a constitutional court,
remain to be formed. Tunisia is build-
ing the democratic ship as it sails,
which has led to public frustration and
confusion. Transitioning countries would
be well served by clearly establishing
the rules o the game from the outset and
developing an ecient and realistic
timeline for forming the crucial institu-
tions to make democracy work.
There are limits, however, to what
one can learn from Tunisia. In particu-
lar, its experience oers no satisfying
answer about how to sequence political
and economic reforms. Leaders in Tunis
chose to focus Ärst on political renewal,
drafting a new constitution, holding
elections, and creating political institu-
tions. Doing so has left the economy