HOW--AND WHY--TO RECRUIT A RUSSIAN SPY 135They would not even agree to pay this confessed KGB agent for a poten-
tially valuable one-time debriefing. The reasoning appeared to be that since
we were on the verge of victory in the Cold War, the KGB was no longer
an enemy target worth pursuing. My reading of the tea leaves turned out
to be correct: the CIA’s new Soviet–East European (SE) Division chief sent
out a worldwide cable telling CIA ops officers to stand down on pursuing
Soviet targets, since the threat from Russia had all but disappeared. (At
the end of the Cold War, SE Division was renamed Central Eurasia [CE]
Division.) Although somewhat reminiscent of the time headquarters shot
down my proposal to aggressively pursue the Cuban spy, this lack of oper-
ational interest was on a much larger and more dangerous scale. I was
flabbergasted by what I considered to be a naïve and shortsighted CIA
approach to an enemy that would never go away.
I met with the Russian again a few days later. I told him that I had dis-
cussed his case with American intelligence officials and they were unwilling
to take him up on his offer. He did not seem to be as surprised as I was by
our lack of interest. He somewhat sheepishly asked if I would at least buy
his Soviet paratrooper’s watch for twenty-five dollars. I happily did so, col-
lecting the first of many Soviet souvenirs that would come my way for years
to come. (Enterprising Afghans made a small fortune selling items like belt
buckles taken from dead Soviet invaders. Old friend R. J. gave one to me,
but I rarely find the right occasion to wear it.) The rebuffed KGB volunteer
still agreed to a full debriefing, even though I could not pay him anything
else. I wrote up a thorough report, including names, dates, operations,
and other details from his KGB career, but never received a response from
headquarters. The CIA was apparently gearing up to cover what they con-
sidered more compelling espionage targets, like the Japanese auto industry.
Despite this egregious if temporary lapse in judgment, it did not take the
CIA long to wake up to the fact that the Russia threat was not going away.
Much to the relief of many CIA officers and analysts, we again began to
focus on targeting certain categories of Russian officials for recruitment.
When not on lengthy TDY assignments from the Washington area
back to the Balkans, I operated primarily in another persona, meeting and