LIFE IMITATES ART IMITATES LIFE 199
tion forces counterparts in Bosnia. Because Karadžić and his small entou-
rage were constantly on the move, and communication with our source
inside his security detail was sporadic and indirect, the key to successfully
apprehending Karadžić depended on the military doing things our way.
We would have no more than a few hours’ notice to react once we’d pin-
pointed Karadžić’s exact location. I had no illusions about how difficult
this would be to pull off. Even if I were still an inside officer, where I’d have
more control over influencing both government and military bureaucracies
to do things my way, it would be an uphill battle. Now I was on the outside,
and all I could do was my best to convince all involved that my approach
would actually work.
Coalition forces in Bosnia were interested but demanded to know the
identities of our sources and other related operational details. They would
not agree to act unless we shared more information. They’d been on the
receiving end of several false tips, so their position was understandable.
Initially I balked at their request and tried to convince them to do things
the way we recommended. I knew that once I ceded control, the odds of
success would decrease exponentially. I had considerable Balkan experi-
ence with the CIA, and in my judgment, this was our best chance to capture
Karadžić. The military refused to accept my recommended approach, and
so I reluctantly shared sourcing and other information with them. I had no
other choice if I wished to move forward.
We knew generally where Karadžić was and which way he was headed,
but our intelligence was often one day old. Our source then reported one
crucial fact: Karadžić had an injury to his leg that would require him at
some point to stop for two days for surgery and preliminary recupera-
tion before moving on. That would be our window of opportunity, and
we would only have a few hours’ notice. I made my case as clearly and as
strongly as possible that coalition forces must hold off on doing anything
until we gave the green light. If they tried to corroborate my information
by going to my sources, or if they jumped the gun before I gave the go-
ahead, they’d spook Karadžić and he’d likely slip away once again.
Everything was teed up on our end, and the military was reportedly
ready to launch. I was in constant, 24/7 communication with both Jovan
and my government contacts. All we could do at that point was await con-
firmation from Jovan’s source that Karadžić was temporarily immobile