CHAPTER 30
IRAQ INTELLIGENCE FAILURE
T
his story could have been included in the previous chapter, but as you
will read, this premeditated intelligence failure in Iraq is so mind-
boggling in nature that it deserves a chapter all its own. Technically it was
not an intelligence failure; it was a spectacular tactical intelligence success
story, followed by an unconscionable bureaucratic failure to properly
manage an invaluable ongoing counterterrorism intelligence operation.
This breakdown in leadership may have inadvertently facilitated the rise
of ISIS. The purpose of this story is not to spill secrets or share sources
and methods, which I will not do, but rather to shed light on how the
US government’s careerist management culture sometimes results in truly
unbelievable intelligence failures for the most mundane of reasons. As far
as I can tell, there is zero accountability when this happens. To echo my
former military colleagues’ advice as we crossed over Mount Igman into
deadly “Indian territory” en route to war-ravaged Sarajevo, “Hang on to
your butts because here we go!”
The US government had no interest in hearing about my business
start-up in Iraq in May 2003. In fact, they advised me against the venture,
since I was a somewhat known former CIA officer, and that (in their con-
sidered opinion) would only lead to disaster.
Fair enough. They had zero obligation to be interested, and I may have
reacted the same way if I’d been in their shoes.
By 2005, my Iraqi gamble was paying off. Although we operated across
all regions of Iraq, we intentionally maintained a very low profile, with a
very Iraqi business “face.” Babylon Inc. was not publicly perceived as an
American company. It was much safer that way, and it was also smart busi-
ness. For example, we would not pay for heavily armed private military
company convoys to get ourselves around the country. They were expen-273