SHIFTING GEARS IN SAUDI ARABIA121
September 2015, oil had hovered near $100 a barrel. At the time of Abdul-
lah’s death in January, the price of a barrel had crashed into the $40s.
Many Saudis would find themselves unprepared for the resulting
changes. Not al- Shehri. His plan was ready.
“It’s difficult to find a solution that will not make pain for some
groups,” the regulator said. “But that pain is worth it.”
THE GRANDSONS
Salman bin Abdul- Aziz al- Saud, half- brother of King Abdullah and for-
mer defense minister and Riyadh governor, took over as king. Salman,
seventy- nine at the time of accession, would be the last in a long line of
sons of Ibn Saud to rule the lands his father conquered and named for
himself in 1932. Shortly after taking power, King Salman appointed the
first pair of crown princes from the third generation, the grandsons of
Ibn Saud. These grandsons not only wielded increasing power and influ-
ence, but they maintained a less paternalistic understanding of the
duties of a ruler.
Salman initially chose his nephew Muhammad bin Nayef, then fifty-
five, as crown prince, his direct heir. Muhammad bin Nayef, the former
interior minister, was well known among elites in the kingdom. In Wash-
ington and other capitals, he was considered a safe pair of hands, a
potential ruler with government experience and a Western education.^10
Salman did not stop there. He also named a backup— a deputy crown
prince— selecting another of the thousand or so grandsons of Ibn Saud,
who had had twenty- two known wives and at least forty- five legitimate
sons.^11 This time, the choice was a wildcard. Salman selected his favorite
son, Muhammad bin Salman.
MbS— as he is known among English speakers— had little governing
experience in the kingdom and even less exposure to the accepted pro-
tocol for a Saudi ruler in the capitals of the West. He was not the “safe
pair of hands” that observers had come to expect from the tightly man-
aged succession process. The choice was a jolt to the kingdom and its