Jim_Krane]_Energy_Kingdoms__Oil_and_Political_Sur
1783. THE BIG PAYBACK
- THE BIG PAYBACK
- Parra estimates the remuneration for “participation” paid by Abu Dhabi, Iran, Iraq,
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia at US 23 cents per barrel of oil produced and less than half
a cent per barrel of reserves. Francisco Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petro-
leum (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 155– 59.
- Valerie Marcel, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Washington,
DC: Brookings, 2006).
- Natural gas, or methane, is a far more powerful greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide.
Historical emissions data from EDGAR ([EU] Emissions Database for Global
Atmospheric Research), “Fossil CO 2 & GHG Emissions of All World Countries,
2 0 1 7 , ” h t t p : / / e d g a r. j r c. e c. e u r o p a. e u / o v e r v i e w. p h p? v=CO2andGHG1970- 2016.
- Andy Flower, “LNG in Qatar,” and Justin Dargin, “Qatar’s Gas Revolution,” both in
Natural Gas Markets in the Middle East and North Africa, ed. Bassam Fattouh and
Jonathan Stern (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2011).
- Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, Jidda, May 21,
1970, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969– 1976, vol. 24, Middle East Region
and Arabian Peninsula, 1969– 1972, Jordan, September 1970, https: //history .state .gov
/ h i s t o r i c a l d o c u m e n t s / f r u s 1 9 6 9 - 7 6 v 2 4 / d 1 4 1.
- Telegram from the Consulate General in Dhahran to the Department of State, Dhah-
ran, August 31, 1969, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969– 1976, vol. 24, Middle
East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969– 1972, Jordan, September 1970, https: //history
. s t a t e. g o v / h i s t o r i c a l d o c u m e n t s / f r u s 1 9 6 9 - 7 6 v 2 4 / d 1 2 8.
- Telegram from the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State, Jidda, May 21,
- Bruce Riedel, Kings and Presidents: Saudi Arabia and the United States Since FDR
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2018), 50– 54.
- Edward R. F. Sheehan, “Sadat’s War,” New York Times Magazine, November 18, 1973,
h t t p : / / w w w. n y t i m e s. c o m / 1 9 7 3 / 1 1 / 1 8 / a r c h i v e s / s a d a t s - w a r - s a d a t s - w a r - c a n a l - c r o s s i n g
.html.
- In the West, the Yom Kippur War is typically misconstrued as a “war of survival” for
Israel, which was, by then, the strongest regional power, with an advanced air force
and a nuclear arsenal. Even Yergin’s narrative succumbs to the fiction of an Israel fac-
ing destruction. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power,
paperback ed. (New York: Free Press, 1991), 603– 5. More credible histories document
the limited aims and weakness of the Syrian and Egyptian armies. Arab leaders’ war
aims were calibrated to reclaim occupied territory and no more. Sadat was so circum-
spect about Egypt’s chances versus the far superior Israeli Army that he told his
generals they only needed to recapture “ten millimeters” of the Sinai and hold it long
enough for the Americans to intervene and force the Israelis to negotiate. Patrick
Seale, Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1995), 194– 200; Moshe Ma’oz, Syria and Israel: From War to Peacemaking (Ox ford:
Clarendon, 1995), 126– 30; Craig Daigle, The Limits of Detente: The United States, the
