William_T._Bianco,_David_T._Canon]_American_Polit

366 Chapter 10Chapter 10 || Interest GroupsInterest Groups

internet service providers (ISPs) from blocking, slowing or speeding up web content or

charging customers additional fees to access certain web services,” so corporations like

AT&T, Verizon, and Comcast were strongly in favor of eliminating the regulation. The

losing side of this debate, which included Microsoft, Google, and Netflix, complained

that the large ISPs influenced the outcome with tens of millions of dollars in lobbying

and contributions. However, lobbying was intense on both sides.^60

Third, many interest groups claim responsibility for policies and election outcomes

regardless of whether their lobbying made the difference. Consider the hotly contested

election to fill the Senate seat of Attorney General Jeff Sessions in Alabama. In the campaign

for or against the two candidates, 45 outside groups spent about $13.7 million, which

surpassed the $13.5 million spent by the candidates themselves. With nearly $10.3 million of

the outside money being spent on behalf of the winning Democratic candidate Doug Jones,

it is not surprising that interest groups would take some credit for the win. However, Roy

Moore was a deeply flawed candidate who was shunned by the Republican leadership in the

Senate (but endorsed by Donald Trump). He was accused of sexually assaulting a 14-year-

old when he was an attorney in his 30s, said that the United States was better off under

slavery, and had been kicked off the state supreme court for refusing to follow the order

of a federal court. Clearly these factors were central in Moore’s defeat.^61 Yet the leaders of

interest groups have a considerable incentive to make strong claims about their group’s

influence and impact, as these claims help them attract members and keep their jobs.^62

Fourth, arguments about the impact of interest groups on election outcomes, such as

Moore’s defeat in 2017, ignore the fact that interest groups are almost always active on

both sides of an election campaign. Although Moore was the target of attack ads funded

by interest groups and many groups gave contributions to his opponent, he also received

support from interest groups in the form of campaign contributions and independent

ads. Thus, it doesn’t make sense to attribute Moore’s defeat to actions taken by one set of

groups without asking why similar efforts on his behalf had no effect. You can’t conclude

that interest groups are all-powerful without explaining why Moore’s supporters were

unable to help him win the election in an overwhelmingly Republican state.

In sum, dire claims about the overwhelming influence of interest groups and

lobbying on Washington policy making are probably wrong. Rather than making a

blanket claim about interest group influence, a better response is to ask, What are the

conditions that enhance a group’s influence over policy, and what are the conditions

that reduce it? That is, what determines when interest groups succeed?

What Determines When Interest Groups Succeed?

Three factors shape interest group influence. The first is the group’s goal: Does it want

to change a policy (including enacting a new policy) or to prevent change? The second

is salience: How many Americans care about what a group is trying to do? The third is

conflict: To what extent do other groups or the public oppose the policy change?

Change versus Preventing Change In general, groups are going to have an easier

time preventing a change than working to implement one. As we discuss in Chapter 2,

enacting a new policy requires the approval of bot h houses of Congress, the president’s

signature (or a veto override), and implementation from the appropriate bureaucratic

agency. Each of these steps provides an opportunity for interest groups to lobby

members of government to do nothing. So if the groups are successful, change will not

occur. Studies show that groups are much more likely to be successful when their goals

involve this kind of negative lobbying that seeks to block changes in policy.^63 Most of the

NR A’s legislative victories in recent years fit this description: the NR A has successfully

But this is the great danger

America faces. That we will cease

to be one nation and become

instead a collection of interest

groups: city against suburb,

region against region, individual

against individual. Each seeking

to satisfy private wants.

— Barbara Jordan, civil rights

leader and former member of

Congress

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