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The structure of Congress 395

constituents’ demands than to take on the responsibility of solving national problems.

And when Congress becomes embroiled in debates about constituencies’ conflicting

demands, the institution may appear ineffectual. But as long as members keep the

“folks back home” happy, their individual popularity will remain high.

“Why

Should

I Care?”

How would you like your member of Congress to represent you? Should members

represent the interests of just their district or the broader nation? Should they be

responsive or responsible? Constituents have an interest in holding their members

accountable, yet most congressional elections are not very competitive. So if

you don’t like how your member is representing you, what can you do about it?

Understanding the nature of representation and the incumbency advantage can

help answer these important questions.

The Structure of Congress

As we have seen, the goal of getting reelected greatly influences the behavior of members

of Congress. The reelection goal also has a strong influence on the way that Congress is

structured, both formally (staff, the committee system, parties, and leadership roles) and

informally (norms). Despite the importance of the electoral connection, the goal of being

reelected cannot explain everything about members’ behavior and the congressional

structure. This section examines some other explanations that underlie the informal and

formal structures of Congress: the policy motivations of members, the partisan basis for

congressional institutions, and the importance of the committee system.

Informal Structures

Various norms provide an informal structure for the way Congress works. Universalism

is the norm that when benefits are divided up, they should be awarded to as many

districts and states as possible. Thus, when it comes to handing out federal highway

dollars or expenditures for the Pentagon’s weapons programs, the benefits are broadly

distributed across the entire country, which means that votes in support of these

bills tend to be very lopsided. For example, the $305 billion 2015 transportation bill

contained some spending in every part of the country and passed by an 83–16 vote in the

Senate and a 359–65 margin in the House.^26

Another norm, logrolling, reinforces universalism with the idea that “if you scratch

my back, I’ll scratch yours.” This norm leads members of Congress to support bills that

they otherwise might not vote for in exchange for other members’ votes on bills that are

very important to them. For example, House members from a dairy state might vote for

tobacco price supports even if their state has no tobacco farmers, and in return they would

expect a member from the tobacco state to vote for the dairy price support bill. This norm

can produce wasteful pork-barrel spending. For example, in the 2011 budget a $1.1 trillion

omnibus appropriations bill contained more than 6,488 earmarks worth $8.3 billion, so

nearly everyone gained something by passing it. The 2016 omnibus appropriations bill

did not include any traditional earmarks, following the ban on formal earmarks in both

the House and Senate in 2011, but there were still billions of dollars in targeted spending

EXAMINE HOW PARTIES, THE

COMMITTEE SYSTEM, AND

STAFFERS ENABLE CONGRESS

TO FUNCTION

logrolling

A form of reciprocity in which

members of Congress support bills

that they otherwise might not vote

for in exchange for other members’

votes on bills that are very important

to them.

earmarks

Federally funded local projects

attached to bills passed through

Congress.

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