Controlling the bureaucracy 479Controlling the Bureaucracy
As the expert implementers of legislation and presidential directives, bureaucrats hold
significant power to influence government policy. This situation creates the problem
of control illustrated by the principal–agent game, as we discussed earlier: elected
officials must figure out how to reap the benefits of bureaucratic expertise without
simply giving bureaucrats free rein to do whatever they want.
One strategy is to take away discretion entirely and give bureaucrats simple, direct
orders. For example, from 1996 to 2015 a law passed by Congress forbade the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) from conducting research that would “advocate or
promote gun control”—which was interpreted by the CDC as limiting all gun-related
research by agency scientists or by outside researchers who received agency funds.^51
(The ban was repealed after a series of mass shootings in 2013, although to this day the
CDC conducts very little gun-related research.) Similarly, the Trump administration
banned the use of the words “climate change” and “global warming” from the
Environmental Protection Agency’s websites and documents and abolished scientific
advisory panels dealing with this topic.^52
The problem with eliminating bureaucrats’ discretion in this way is that it limits
the positive influence of their expertise. Particularly when new policies are being
developed, taking away bureaucratic discretion is costly for legislators or presidential
appointees, as it forces them to work out the policy details themselves—and may
produce less effective policies than those constructed by bureaucrats with specialized
knowledge.^53 Moreover, preventing bureaucrats from using their judgment makes
it impossible for them to craft policies that take into account new developments or
unforeseen circumstances.^54
For all these reasons, elected officials must find other ways to reduce or eliminate
bureaucratic drift—that is, bureaucrats’ pursuit of their own goals rather than their
assignments from officeholders or appointees—while still reaping the benefits of
bureaucratic expertise. This section describes two common strategies: changing
the way agencies are organized and staffed and using standardized procedures
for monitoring agency actions. In both cases, the aim is to set up agencies so that
bureaucrats can use their expertise, while making sure their actions are consistent
with elected officials’ wishes.^55 These measures mitigate—but do not eliminate—the
problem of control (see the Take a Stand feature).Agency Organization
Over the last 20 years, political scientists have shown how agencies can be organized
to minimize bureaucratic drift.^56 Specifically, when an agency is set up or given new
responsibilities, the officials who initiate the change don’t simply tell the new agency
what to do. To make sure that the agency pursues the policies officials want, they
also determine where the agency is located within the federal government structure
and who runs it. These efforts may occur solely within Congress, may involve both
Congress and the president, or may be arranged by presidential actions.^57
For example, one of the Obama administration’s responses to the 2008 financial
crisis was to form a new agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
which would help enforce new bank regulations and investigate consumer complaints
about financial firms. However, Republican senators opposed Obama’s initial
nominee to run the agency, Elizabeth Warren, believing she would encourage her
subordinates to be excessively pro-consumer. Similarly, in 2017 President TrumpEXPLAIN HOW CONGRESS
AND THE PRESIDENT
OVERSEE THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCHbureaucratic drift
Bureaucrats’ tendency to implement
policies in a way that favors their
own political objectives rather than
following the original intentions of
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