390 ChaPter^7
to recognize the GDR as an independent country, so the Soviets continued to
underwrite the East German government while trying to contain West
Germany [the FRG]. By late 1958, the Soviets feared that the western
Germans might take some drastic actions against the East, either politically,
economically, or militarily. Thus Khrushchev felt he had to take action, and in
a series of speeches in November 1958 he presented the West with a hard
dilemma, calling on the nations with occupation rights–the United States,
Britain, and France–to sign the German peace treaty, or else Russia would
reach a separate treaty with East Germany, the GDR, granting it indepen-
dence, and giving it full control over all of Berlin, not just the East, and he
set a 6-month timetable for such actions. Khrushchev was serious about the
German issue, but also cautious. In a talk with the Polish leader Gomulka, he
observed “war will not result from it. There will be tensions, of course, there
will be a blockade. They might test to see our reaction. In any case we will
have to show a great deal of cold blood in this matter.” At the same time,
Khrushchev sought a high-level U.S.-Soviet conference, invited Vice-President
Richard Nixon to Moscow, and passed along a backchannel note telling
Nixon “Don’t worry about Berlin. There is not going to be any war over
Berlin.” The Soviet Premier similarly sought to cool down the more militant
eastern German Communist leadership, telling them “do not hurry. The wind
does not blow in your face... The conditions are not ripe as yet for a new
scheme of things.”
By 1959, the crisis was ongoing. In June, the Soviet leader did not close
off the possibility of German reunification, but stressed that the Germans
themselves, not outside forces, would have to make that decision. In September
he visited the U.S. presidential retreat at Camp David to meet with Eisenhower
to discuss Berlin. Prior to visiting Washington, he spoke at the U.N. and
proposed “general and complete disarmament in three years” and, despite
claims that Communism would “bury” Capitalism, Khrushchev pledged
“peaceful coexistence” between the superpowers. “You may live under capi-
talism,” he observed, “and we will live under socialism and build communism.
The one whose system proves better will win.” At Camp David, Eisenhower
and Khrushchev compromised and seemed to ease the Berlin crisis: the pres-
ident promised the Soviet leader a summit meeting in the near future, and
Khrushchev agreed to drop his ultimatum over the timing of a decision on
Berlin.Eisenhower, however, also signaled that he was still considering provid-
ing nuclear arms to the FRG, West Germany, prompting Khrushchev to imply