100 CHAPTER THREE ■ InternatIonal relatIons theorIes
regime from power in Iraq. Having escalated its threats and amassed its troops on Iraq’s
borders to coerce the regime into giving up power, the United States had no choice but
to act militarily when that coercion failed.
Yet not all realists agree that the policy the United States pursued was the correct
one. Realists are engaging in an in ter est ing discussion about whether the U.S. opera-
tion was necessary. John Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, and Stephen Walt, a defen-
sive realist, have jointly argued that the war was not necessary. Before the war began,
they wrote that U.S. military power could deter any threat Saddam posed, even his
pos si ble attainment of nuclear weapons. They further argued that, even if the war went
well and had positive long- term consequences, it would be unnecessary and could
engender long- term animosity toward the United States, both in the Middle East
and around the world. The policy of deterrence the United States employed had
worked previously and could have continued to work.^30
But other realist theorists, as well as President George W. Bush, believed that Sad-
dam was not being effectively deterred. The Bush administration argued that Sad-
dam’s use of chemical weapons against the Kurds in the past meant that it was
probable he would use these weapons to threaten the United States. This perceived
threat influenced the Bush administration’s decision to invade. In addition, some real-
ists in the Bush administration argued that a forceful response to Saddam’s flouting of
his obligations to the international community (his government was in violation of
agreements it had signed as part of the settlement that ended the first Gulf War in
1991) would deter other enemies of the United States and its allies from actions that
harmed U.S. and allied interests. Perhaps a dramatic show of force could also curtail
what the administration referred to as state- sponsored terrorism. Realists clearly can
draw diff er ent policy prescriptions from theory.
Liberal Perspectives
A liberal view of the 2003 Iraq War would utilize all three levels of analy sis. With res-
pect to the individual level, Saddam was clearly an abusive leader whose atrocities
against his own population were made evident in the aftermath of the war, with the
discovery of mass graves. He was aggressive not only against domestic opponents of
his regime but also against other peoples within the region; he even supported some
terrorist activities against enemies in the West. With res pect to the state level, liberals
would emphasize the characteristics of the Iraqi regime— mainly its authoritarian
nature— and the notion that replacement by a democracy would decrease the coercive
threat of the Iraqi state and enhance stability in the Middle East. A demo cratic Iraq
would be a beacon for other nascent democracies nearby. The fact that many liberals
believed that Saddam’s regime had acquired, or was very close to acquiring, weapons