Karen_A._Mingst,_Ivan_M._Arregu_n-Toft]_Essentia

120 CHAPTER fouR ■ The InTernaTIonal SySTem

rus sIa, syrIa, and the InternatIonal system

Rus sian air strikes against targets in Syria, its

deployment of “volunteer” ground forces into the

country (as highlighted in the New York Times

headline “Kremlin Says Rus sian ‘Volunteer’ forces

Will fight in Syria”),a and the escalating tension

caused by the Turkish downing of a Rus sian

bomber over its alleged incursion into Turkish air

space all represent a complex and dangerous

turn of events. The situation is complicated. Rus­

sia, a long­ time ally of Syria, supports the Assad

regime and Iran; it opposes the Islamic State and

moderate rebels fighting the Syrian government.

The united States supports Syrian Kurds, the

moderate rebels, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf

states, but opposes the IS, the Assad regime, and

Iran. Iran supports Assad but opposes the IS,

Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and moderate reb­

els. Turkey supports the moderate rebels, Saudi

Arabia, and its Gulf allies, but opposes Assad, the

IS, Iran, and the Syrian Kurds. To counter Ira nian

influence, the Sunni Arab states like Saudi Ara­

bia and Qatar fund and arm the Syrian rebels, but

are increasingly alarmed by the IS and have joined

the u.S.­ led co ali tion against the IS. The situation

is dangerous because the united States, france,

and several regional states are flying combat air

sorties over Syria both targeting the IS and sup­

porting moderate rebel groups, while the Rus sian

planes are targeting opponents of Assad and

the IS. There is a real possibility that the vari ous

combatants might engage, increasing the like­

lihood of a military confrontation.

What explains Rus sia’s military intervention

in  Syria? one possibility is that Rus sia’s leaders

are acting more assertively in the interstate sys­

tem to increase domestic po liti cal support for the

regime at a time when material and economic

conditions in Rus sia are in decline. Rus sia’s gov­

ernment launched military attacks in Syria, just

as  it had in Crimea and ukraine, to continue to

distract from its poor rec ord of governance in

Rus sia: low investment in national education,

health care, and transportation infrastructure

has caused many Rus sians to become resentful,

and others to emigrate. Supporting Syria, its

long­ time ally, opens another military engage­

ment far from home. Another possibility relates

to Rus sia’s long history of strug gle with Islam­

inspired insurgency. The fall of Chechnya in 1996

to nationalist insurgents— many of whom were

Muslims— greatly compromised Rus sia’s military

reputation and emboldened nationalists and rad­

ical Muslims to attack Rus sia. By attacking “ter­

rorists” opposing an allied leader in the Middle

East, Rus sia not only distracts from its domestic

and economic trou bles, but also harms the repu­

tation of radical fighters claiming Islam as their

motivation, and at the same time, enhances its

prestige as a great power with global reach.

Although Rus sia’s foreign policy appears to be

realist at its core— intervening militarily far from

its shores to expand and defend its interests in

the Middle East, and weakening the power of the

united States and its allies in the same region—

both constructivism and feminism offer alternative

insights.

The argument that Rus sia’s need to enhance

its prestige may explain its actions is directly

engaged by constructivism. Being a great power

is not only about relative material power, a con­

structivist would argue, but also about the foreign

policy “scripts” that attach to power. Great powers

Behind The headlines

ESSIR7_CH04_106_131_11P.indd 120 6/14/16 10:04 AM