The Exercise of State Power 159ultimately to bring down the government. The sanctions may have achieved the first
goal of driving the disarmament pro cess and keeping most of Iraq’s oil wealth out of
the hands of Saddam Hussein. The more general goal of removing Saddam from
power was not achieved; accomplishing that goal would require military action. We
can also see ambiguous results in the sanctions the Eu ro pean Union and the United
States imposed against Rus sia in 2014; these sanctions were in response to the Rus sian
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and in support for separatists in Ukraine. The
Rus sian economy was clearly hurt; the economy shrunk in early 2015 by 2 percent,
losing $26.8 billion in value. Rus sian officials acknowledged “meaningful” economic
harm, but averred that the price was worth it. They would continue to support Ukrai-
nian separatists, even if sanctions adversely affected their economy.
Sanctions the United States and the Eu ro pean Union took against Iran and its
petrochemical and oil industries in 2011–13, designed to cut off that country from the
international financial system, produced diff er ent results. Iran experienced an estimated
$9 billion loss every quarter, leading to a dramatic decline in the value of its currency
and weakening the Ira nian economy, with direct effects on the population experienc-
ing shortages in all sectors. That outcome may have led Iran to the negotiating table
in 2014–15, although we cannot prove that was the cause or the reason for the final
agreement.
So how successful are sanctions as a tool of statecraft? One empirical study of
UN- imposed sanctions (62 cases) differentiates between vari ous kinds of sanctions:
sanctions that intend to change be hav ior; sanctions that constrain access to critical
goods or funds; and sanctions that signal or stigmatize targets in support of interna-
tional norms. The study found that sanctions were effective 22 percent of the time in
achieving at least one of the three purposes. They were more effective in signaling or
constraining a target than in coercing a change in be hav ior. In only 10 percent of the
cases were sanctions effective in actually changing be hav ior.^17
These findings suggest that while sanctions are typically viewed as a cheaper and eas-
ier tool for coercion and punishment than the use of armed force, they may be effective in
limited cases. These outcomes have led realist theorists to conclude that states must use
the threat of force to achieve their objective of changing the be hav ior of another state.
the Use of force
Force (and the threat of force) is another critical instrument of statecraft and is central
to realist thinking. Like economic statecraft, a state may use force or its threat either
to get a target state to do something or to undo something that state has done—
compellence—or to keep an adversary from doing something— deterrence.^18 Liberal
theorists are more likely to advocate compellent strategies, moving cautiously to deter-
rence, whereas realists promote deterrence.