The Just War Tradition 293
tion technique and torture. The subject has been debated by U.S. presidential candi-
dates in 2011 and 2016, when some Republican candidates supported waterboarding
and other enhanced techniques. Others responded that waterboarding was torture,
and therefore inherently un- American.
Another recent debate around morals and ethics in war has surfaced surrounding
drone strikes. Initially, drones were used to place sophisticated eyes and ears over com-
bat areas without risking pi lots and expensive aircraft. But their use has increased
radically since 2001. Many drones in the U.S. inventory are armed with missiles that
operators thousands of miles away can aim and launch. From 2004 to 2015, an esti-
mated 2,476–3,989 people were killed and 1,158–1,738 injured in U.S. CIA drone
strikes in Pakistan alone. Of these, an estimated 423–965 were noncombatants,
including 172–207 children. Yemen and Somalia have also seen the number of lethal
drone strikes rise.
Two main questions currently surround the use of drone strikes in a just war.
First, what safeguards ensure that those targeted by drone strikes are actually guilty of
terrorism or of harming allied personnel? Most of those targeted do not wear uniforms,
nor do they formally serve a state. The pro cess by which U.S. intelligence agencies deter-
mine targets remains classified. Second, and related, is the harm caused by drone missile
strikes justified? In the above statistics on Pakistan, for example, 17–24 percent of those
killed in drone strikes were noncombatants.
the Debate over humanitarian Intervention
No issue emerging from the just war tradition has been more critical or controversial
than the debate over humanitarian intervention. The just war tradition asserts that
military intervention by states or the international community may be justified or
even obligatory to alleviate massive violations of human rights. Yet that position
directly contradicts a hallmark of the Westphalian tradition— re spect for state sov-
ereignty. Historically, states selectively applied military intervention on behalf of
humanitarian causes. In the nineteenth century, Eu ro pe ans used military force to
protect Christians in Turkey and the Middle East, though they chose not to protect
other religious groups. And Eu ro pean nations did not intervene militarily to stop
slavery, though they prohibited their own citizens from participating in the slave
trade.^24
Since the end of World War II, the notion has emerged that all h uman beings deserve
protection— not just par tic u lar groups— and that states have an obligation to inter-
vene. This idea is called the responsibility to protect (R2P). The idea is that in cases
of massive violations of human rights, when domestic ave nues for redress have been
exhausted and actions by other states might reasonably end the abuse, these states have
a responsibility to intervene in the domestic affairs of the state in which the abuse is