Eu rope in the Nineteenth Century 37wardness would affect it severely. As the war opened, Japa nese forces surrounded a key
Rus sian fortress at Port Arthur. Rus sia’s lack of sufficient railroads meant it could not
reinforce its forces in the Far East by rail, so it attempted to relieve the siege by send
ing a naval flotilla from its Baltic home ports 18,000 miles away. But after a very costly
Japa nese assault, Port Arthur was captured while the Rus sian fleet was still at sea. In
May 1905, the Rus sian and Japa nese fleets clashed in Tsushima Bay, and the result
was perhaps the greatest naval defeat in history: Rus sia lost eight battleships, some 5,000
sailors were killed, and another 5,000 were captured as prisoners of war. The Japa nese
lost three torpedo boats and 116 sailors. The impact of Japan’s victory would extend
far beyond the defeat of Rus sia in the Far East. An Asian power’s defeat of a white
colonial power seriously compromised a core ideological foundation of colonialism—
that whites were inherently superior to nonwhites. The Rus sian defeat spurred Japa
nese expansion and caused Germany to discount Rus sia’s ability to interfere with
German ambitions in Eu rope. Rus sia’s defeat severely compromised the legitimacy of
the tsar, setting in motion a revolution that, after 1917, was to topple the Rus sian empire
and replace it with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR, or the Soviet Union).
The final collapse of the balance of power system came with World War I. Germany’s
rapid rise in power intensified the destabilizing impact of the hardening of alliances
at the turn of the twentieth century. By 1912, Germany had exceeded France and
Britain in both heavy industrial output and population growth. Germany also
feared Rus sian efforts to modernize its relatively sparse railroad network. Being “late
comers” to the core of Eu ro pean power, and having defeated France in the Franco
Prussian War (1870), many Germans felt that Germany had not received the diplomatic
recognition and status it deserved. This lack of recognition in part explains why
Germany encouraged Austria Hungary to crush Serbia following the assassination
of Archduke Franz Ferdinand (heir to the throne of the Austro Hungarian Empire),
who was shot in Sarajevo in June 1914. Like most of Eu rope’s leaders at the time,
Germany’s leaders believed war made the state and its citizens stronger, and that back
ing down after a humiliation would only encourage further humiliations. Besides, the
outcome of a local war between Austria Hungary and Serbia was certain to be a quick
victory for Germany’s most impor tant ally.
But under the tight system of alliances, the fateful shot set off a chain reaction. What
Germany had hoped would remain a local war soon escalated to a continental war,
once Rus sia’s tsar ordered a premobilization of Rus sian forces. And once German troops
crossed into Belgium (thus violating British guaranteed Belgian neutrality), that con
tinental war escalated to a world war when Britain sided with France and Rus sia. The
Ottoman Empire, long a rival with Rus sia, entered the war on the side of Germany
and Austria Hungary. Both sides anticipated a short, decisive war (over by Christmas),
but this did not happen. Germany’s Schlieffen Plan— its strategy for a decisive victory in
a two front war against Rus sia and France— failed almost immediately, leading to aESSIR7_CH02_020_069_11P.indd 37 6/14/16 10:02 AM