The Cold War 53was underwritten by both the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union. But,
as the South Viet nam ese government and military faltered on their own, the United
States stepped up its military support, increasing the number of its troops on the ground
and escalating the air war over the north.
In the early stages, the United States was confident of victory; after all, a super-
power with all its military hardware and technically skilled labor force could surely
beat a poorly trained Vietcong guerrilla force. American policy makers were quickly
disillusioned, however, as communist forces proved adept at avoiding the massive tech-
nical firepower of U.S. forces, and a corrupt South Viet nam ese leadership siphoned
away many of the crucial resources needed to win its more vital strug gle for popu lar
legitimacy. As U.S. casualties mounted, with no prospects for victory in sight, the U.S.
public grew disenchanted. Should the U.S. use all of its conventional military capability
to prevent the “fall” of South Vietnam and stave off the domino effect? Should the U.S.
fight until victory was guaranteed for liberalism and capitalism, or should it extricate
itself from this unpopular quagmire? Should the U.S. capitulate to the forces of ideo-
logical communism? These questions, posed in both geostrategic and ideological terms,
defined the middle years of the Cold War, from the Vietnam War’s slow beginning inFor the United States, Vietnam became a symbol of the Cold War rivalries in Asia. The United
States supported the South Viet nam ese forces against the communist regime in the north.
Here, a female Vietcong guerrilla prepares to fire an anti- tank rifle during the Tet Offensive
of 1968.ESSIR7_CH02_020_069_11P.indd 53 6/14/16 10:02 AM