Four additional recent developments merit attention. First, “China’s peaceful rise”
was a term first used by China’s leadership in 2003; it was meant to frame China’s grow
ing economic, military, and diplomatic power as something that would not provoke
fear and insecurity in China’s neighbors. Yet since 2014, China has been expanding its
military at a very high rate, making it the world’s second largest military bud get behind
the United States. In addition, in 2014, China began the practice of dredging large
quantities of sand onto fragile coral reefs in the disputed waters of the Spratly Islands.
These islands are a critical strategic resource for Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia,
and Taiwan, who have each responded with their own dredging programs, though on
a much smaller scale. If China’s “peaceful rise” was intended to allay regional or inter
national concerns about rising Chinese power, China’s military spending and dredg
ing have had the opposite effect. In October 2015, the U.S. Navy sent the guided missile
destroyer USS Lassen to within 12 nautical miles of one of these artificial islands in
protest, and tensions in the area— which not only traverses key shipping routes but is
said to contain vast energy resources— have continued to rise.
Second, in 2014, the Rus sian Federation invaded Ukraine—an in de pen dent sov
ereign state— and then annexed the Ukrainian province of Crimea (along with its
strategically impor tant port of Sevastopol). The action was undertaken not by Rus
sian Federation soldiers in Rus sian uniform, but by Rus sian soldiers (often special
forces) wearing uniforms without insignia (a practice now called hybrid warfare).
This tactic enabled both the Rus sian government and NATO and EU representatives
to support the argument that no violation of international law had actually taken
place, although outside of Rus sia, no credible authorities believe this assertion. What
is perhaps most dangerous about Rus sian foreign policy in Ukraine is not its annexa
tion of Crimea as such, but the pre ce dent the action has set. In a move reminiscent of
Germany’s claims about Sudeten Germans in 1938, Rus sia argued that its citizens in
Crimea and Ukraine were being physically threatened after the legitimate govern
ment of Ukraine had fallen in a coup. NATO members Poland, Slovakia, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are concerned that Rus sia might use similar
tactics to bring down their governments and annex large portions of their respective
territories.
Third, Germany has been the Eu ro pean Union’s most reliable engine of economic
productivity and growth, but since 2009, the economic health and even long term
sustainability of the Eurozone has come into question. Fellow EU members Greece,
Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus have proved unable to repay or refinance their
government debt. This inability has led to serious po liti cal tensions between Germany
and the “northern tier” of Eurozone states. The wealthier nations have come under
pressure to forgive the debt. And the debtor states claim that what ever the causes of
their economic prob lems, allowing them to go bankrupt would destroy the Eu ro pean
Union and, by extension perhaps, the relative peace that Eu ro pe ans have come to expect.66 CHAPTER Two ■ Historical context of international relationsESSIR7_CH02_020_069_11P.indd 66 6/14/16 10:02 AM