The Economist UK - 31.08.2019

20 BriefingHungary The EconomistAugust 31st 2019

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freeing up hundreds of posts for Fidesz loy-

alists. It set up a National Judiciary Office

run by Tunde Hando, a college contempo-

rary of Mr Orban’s. Her nine-year term,

which is due to end next year and under

current laws could not be renewed, makes

her unsackable by parliament. Ms Hando

can veto judicial promotions and influence

which judges hear which cases. Fidesz now

enjoys control of prosecutors’ offices, the

constitutional court and the Curia (the

highest court of appeals).

With the courts under its thumb, Fidesz

pushed through a new constitution,

drafted in part by Joszef Szajer, Ms Hando’s

husband. In 2013 the constitutional court

struck down some of Fidesz’s new laws, in-

cluding one that threatened various

churches with a loss of official recognition.

Parliament responded by writing the laws

into the constitution.

In 2018 a new code of procedure gave

courts powers to reject civil filings more

easily. Peter Szepeshazi, a former judge,

says they can stumble over trivial errors

such as a wrong phone number: “If it’s un-

friendly to the political or economic elite,

they have an excuse to send it back.” (The

government calls this claim “unsubstanti-

ated”.) A report in April by the European As-

sociation of Judges said Ms Hando was rid-

ing roughshod over judicial independence.

The government appears to want yet

more say over the judiciary. Since 2016 it

has been planning an entirely new system

of administrative courts in which the Jus-

tice Ministry would have direct influence.

These courts would handle, among other

things, disputes over the media and elec-

tions—areas where the regular courts still,

occasionally, rule against the government.

The Venice Commission of the Council of

Europe, a legal watchdog, has criticised the

system, and in May the government put it

on hold to keep its membership in the pow-

erful epp group of the European Parlia-

ment, which had threatened to expel it.

It is not clear why Fidesz worries about

the power to settle election disputes. Hav-

ing gerrymandered the single-member dis-

tricts after winning power in 2010, the

party continues to win almost all elections.

In 2011 Mr Orban granted voting rights to

some 2m ethnic Hungarians who are citi-

zens of neighbouring Romania, Slovakia,

Serbia and Ukraine, and who overwhelm-

ingly plump for Fidesz. They are allowed to

vote by post. The roughly 350,000 Hungar-

ian citizens living in the West are much

less likely to support the party. They have to

vote in person at embassies or consulates.

This all explains how, in the general

election last year, Fidesz won 67% of the

parliamentary seats—maintaining its su-

permajority—while taking just less than

half of the popular vote. With the system so

well re-designed, the party has no need to

stoop to voter fraud, as cruder autocracies

do. But the “system of national co-opera-

tion” is nothing if not thorough. In 2018 the

National Election Office ruled thousands

of postal votes invalid because the tamper-

proof tape on the envelopes had been

opened. In response, the government re-

voked the law requiring tamper-proof tape.

Legal fine-tuning has been used to sup-

press the opposition’s messages. In 2012,

when esma, a Spanish-Hungarian com-

pany that held the concession for advertis-

ing on Budapest’s streetlamps was accept-

ing advertisements from leftist parties, the

city council banned all outdoor advertise-

ments within five metres of roadways. The

sidewalk kiosks owned by a government-

friendly advertising group were exempted

from the ban. In 2015 the almost bankrupt

esma was bought by Istvan Garancsi, a

businessman friendly with Mr Orban. The

five-metre ban was promptly repealed.

This is just one of the ways Fidesz keeps

the media on its side. The country’s biggest

opposition newspaper, Nepszabadsag, was

bought out and shuttered in 2016 by a com-

pany thought to be linked to Lorinc Mesza-

ros, a boyhood friend of Mr Orban’s who is

now the country’s second-wealthiest busi-

nessman. Lajos Simicska, a member of Mr

Orban’s school and college cohort, built a

large business and media empire that sup-

ported Fidesz in the 2010s. In 2015 he fell

out with Mr Orban and lost most of his

companies, but held on to Magyar Nemzet,

another newspaper. After Fidesz’s over-

whelming election victory in 2018, though,

he closed it. Independent media are now

confined largely to websites read by a few

people in Budapest’s liberal bubble.

Deep Fake State

Content is controlled, too. After taking

power in 2010, Mr Orban’s government be-

gan transforming mti, the country’s public

news agency, into a propaganda organ. In

2011 parliament made mti’s wire-service

free, driving competing news agencies out

of business. Regional newspapers that

lacked reporting staff became channels for

mti’s pro-government messaging, and it is

from those newspapers that Mr Orban’s ru-

ral base gets its news. The government uses

its advertising budget, which has quadru-

pled in real terms to more than $300m per

year, to bring any rogue newspapers in line.

The country’s domestically owned tele-

vision and radio stations are nearly all pro-

government. Last November the owners of

476 media outlets, including some of the

biggest in the country, donated them free

of charge to a new non-profit foundation

known as kesma, whose goals include pro-

moting “Christian and national values”.

When opposition groups challenged

kesmafor violating the country’s media

law, Mr Orban declared the foundation vi-

tal to the national interest, removing it

from the media authority’s jurisdiction.

Turning media outlets into propaganda

factories has not been good for their quali-

ty. In February the kesmafoundation’s first

chairman, a former Fidesz mp, carelessly

joked in an interview that the pro-govern-

ment media was so dull that even Fidesz

Step by step

Source:The Economist

Viktor Orban wins election

with 53% of vote, giving

Fidesz two-thirds of seats →

Vote given to ethnic

Hungarians abroad

Media authority created

with power to fine outlets

for unbalanced coverage

New constitution passed

Constitutional

court expanded

from 11 to 15

Parliament cut from

386 to 199 seats

Mr Orban re-elected

with 45% of vote,

holds two-thirds

of seats

Mr Orban re-elected with

49% of vote, holds

two-thirds of seats

“Soros law ”criminalises

helping refugees

Poster

campaign

against

Jean-Claude

Juncker &

George

Soros

Mr Orban breaks with

Lajos Simicska, blocks

his company from

public tenders

Large numbers of

asylum-seekers cross

from Serbia towards Austria

Anti-migrant

fence built

Election authority

fines Jobbik $2m

2010 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

↖

Source: National election office

Hungary, single-member districts won

in general election, April 2018

Party list vote share, %

Fidesz: 91 MSZP: 8 LMP: 1

Jobbik: 1 Others: 5

Fidesz

49.2

Jobbik

19.1

MSZP

11.9

LMP

7.1

Others 12.7

Colour revolution