The EconomistAugust 31st 2019 China 51A
t the peakof Kublai Khan’s empire-building career, his repu-
tation for ferocity was such that Mongol armies conquered
some cities with handwritten notes, wrapped around arrows and
fired over the walls. A typical letter urged inhabitants to submit at
once to avoid a siege that was sure to end in mass slaughter. Van-
quished local rulers, if lucky, might be granted a princely death,
sewn into a sack and then trampled by horses.
Though China’s Communist Party probably dislikes compari-
sons to a Mongol horde, its leaders are trying similar tactics in
their confrontation with Hong Kong. Videos have been released
showing Chinese soldiers practising riot suppression and para-
military police massing just across the border from Hong Kong. Of-
ficials have declared that 12 weeks of pro-democracy marches and
anti-government protests, many of them vast and peaceful but
some of them small and violent, amount to a “colour revolution”
with elements of “terrorism”. Well-briefed Hong Kong tycoons
have hinted at a deadline for displays of defiance by the territory to
end: October 1st, when the 70th anniversary of the People’s Repub-
lic of China will be marked in Beijing with a grand parade. On Au-
gust 25th the state news agency, Xinhua, reported on a gathering of
officials to study speeches by Deng Xiaoping, the leader who de-
vised the “one country, two systems” model, a promise to preserve
Hong Kong’s Western-style freedoms after British rule ended in
- That pledge of autonomy is quite compatible with sending
troops to crack skulls, Xinhua reported: Deng himself stipulated
that if Hong Kong drifted into turmoil, the central government
should intervene.
Nobody should doubt that, if they sense Hong Kong sliding out
of control, China’s leaders would use violence to preserve their au-
thority, even if that would spark massive civil disobedience, tank
Hong Kong’s stock- and property markets, and risk pushing Ameri-
can politicians, notably in Congress, from suspicion of China into
a full-blown cold war. Yet, like Mongol missives zinging over city
walls, the government’s threats are at once serious and a stratagem
to frighten Hong Kongers into disowning the protesters and suing
for peace. For sending in troops would be an admission of failure.
Privately, some informed figures in Beijing play down the idea
that October 1st is a deadline for ending the impasse, murmuring
that Hong Kong, a tiny place of 7m people, cannot overshadow cel-
ebrations by a motherland of 1.4bn citizens. That raises a question:
if China is signalling that it is at once implacable but somewhat pa-
tient, what do party leaders have in mind for Hong Kong?
Multiple, overlapping campaigns are likely to enforce loyalty to
China. One campaign is visibly under way within that part of Hong
Kong that resembles an oligarchy. Chinese officials have scolded
tycoons for allowing society to become so unequal and unafford-
able. A best-case scenario would see curbs on magnates’ rent-seek-
ing. Less happily, officials have told company bosses to suppress
dissent among their employees or quit, as happened to the chief
executive of Hong Kong’s flagship airline, Cathay Pacific.
Less visible, but just as important, is a looming purge within
the bit of Hong Kong that resembles a technocracy: the world of
professionals who, for better or worse, have helped to run Hong
Kong since colonial times, in the absence of full democracy. With
youngsters dominating so many protests, Hong Kong’s schools
and university campuses will be early targets for scrutiny. Omi-
nously, a prominent pro-mainland politician talks of educators
who “hate China” and teach the same to their students.
Hong Kong has already seen attempts to marginalise pro-de-
mocracy voices in civil society for more than a decade. Now profes-
sionals are braced for a second purge, targeting pro-business con-
servatives who side with the government 80% or 90% of the time,
but who—notably as the current protests began in opposition to a
proposed extradition law that would have exposed Hong Kongers
to the mainland’s criminal justice system—have voiced qualms or
urged the authorities to make concessions. Such conservatives
have long dominated such bodies as the Law Society or the Insti-
tute of Engineers, which in turn help fill umpteen disciplinary
panels and advisory committees that make Hong Kong tick. Others
sit in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (LegCo), often representing
“functional constituencies” consisting of a few thousand mem-
bers of this or that industry or profession.Better Red than expert
Mainland institutions that once shunned the spotlight, notably
the central government’s Liaison Office, are increasingly open in
their lobbying. Dennis Kwok, a pro-democracy politician and bar-
rister who represents the legal constituency in LegCo, notes that
particular controversy surrounds elections within professional
bodies that allow for proxy voting. Junior members of law firms are
routinely told to hand over proxy votes to partners, charges Mr
Kwok. Then at election time, firms “get calls from clients, or from
the Bank of China”, urging block-voting for candidates favoured by
the Liaison Office. Time and again, China-friendly “Reds” are driv-
ing out old-school conservatives, says Mr Kwok. The authorities in
Beijing “want people who are absolutely loyal”.
Several professionals describe how architects, lawyers, engi-
neers and the like are urged to join study tours of the mainland.
Lectures and visits to Chinese patriotic sites allow the Liaison Of-
fice and its allies to scout for potential recruits. Later, reunions are
organised back in Hong Kong, creating networks. Loyalists can ex-
pect lucrative projects and offers of work on the mainland.
Such patronage politics lacks the drama of troops on the
streets. It will still disgust many Hong Kongers, for the city’s politi-
cal culture—as millions of marchers have made clear—includes a
respect for individual rights and accountable government wholly
alien to the bossy, collectivist, croneyish autocrats in Beijing. Alas,
as Kublai Khan knew, not all conquests require invasion. 7Chaguan Getting a grip
How China might bring Hong Kong to heel without sending troops from the mainland