Britain at War - 09.2019

52 http://www.britainatwar.com

DAVID TRUESDALE OFFERS A SHARP REBUTTAL TO CLAIMS THAT ARNHEM

WAS LOST – OR COULD HAVE BEEN WON – IF NOT FOR THE ACTIONS OF

ONE CAPTAIN. THE MAN IN QUESTION WAS LORD CARRINGTON.

BELOW

The 82nd Airborne

Division was unable

to secure its target

bridges, but faced

tougher resistance

than anticipated.

US SIGNAL CORPS/

VIA AUTHOR

F

CARRINGTON – ONE MAN'S DECISION|ARNHEM

Market

Garden

CARRINGTON

ONE MAN'S

DECISION

ailure at Arnhem. A tricky phrase. When it appears in

the historiography, it often demonstrates the author’s

inability to fully understand Market Garden – or how

it progressed – in its intricate entirety. The complicated,

multi-faceted operation required British 1st Airborne

Division, in concert with the 1st Polish Independent

Parachute Brigade Group, to capture a number of bridges

in the Arnhem area and secure a bridgehead on the north

bank of the river. Asked to hold for 24 to 48 hours, they

held for nine days. There was no ‘failure’ at Arnhem.

The same cannot be said for the

operation as a whole and overall

failure cannot be disputed. Market

Garden became an extremely costly

venture. Market Garden was a British

Second Army operation, spearheaded

by XXX Corps, flanked by VIII and

XII Corps and involving the First

Allied Airborne Army, consisting

of the US 82nd and 101st Airborne

Divisions, and the aforementioned

British and Polish airborne formations.

The lack of success is blamed on many

factors. To begin with there were

severe shortcomings in operational

and tactical command combined with

woeful co-operation between the

airborne and XXX Corps – as the

various airborne planning officers

began to organise drop and landing

zones, no senior staff officers from

21st Army Group, Second Army,

or XXX Corps attended any of the

meetings.

Then, there were failures on the

parts of the RAF and USAAF in that

no thorough air reconnaissance of the

route ahead of XXX Corps had been

carried out. There was also a lack of

air support in the later stages, felt

mostly by the embattled 1st Airborne,

hemmed in around Arnhem and

Oosterbeek, under building German

pressure. Blame can also be attributed

to the choice of landing and drop

zones. In the case of both the 82nd and

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