80 CHAPTER THREE
(If I were a cat I might see a place to scratch.) But I do not have to use high-
level thought to grasp this — perception of the chair contains the parame-
ters for action.^6 Embodied simulation theory suggests that this mechanism
also works when observing others relating to objects. When I see Amy with
her back to the chair and bending her knees, I do not have to consciously
think “she is going to sit down”; action understanding is achieved through
the firing of cells that would also be involved in the actions of sitting my-
self. This includes actions that Amy hasn’t taken yet but would be the next
steps in a pattern of motor actions (see Iacoboni et al. 2005). Mirroring
is predictive (it can garner information about what the action is aimed at
accomplishing before its completion) because for Amy and me, intentional
actions are embodied in the same way. That is, they use the same motor
schema. I would not have the same response if I were observing a creature —
say, a robot — that uses a different motor schema. Gallese explains: “When
a given action is planned, its expected motor consequences are forecast.
This means that when I am going to execute a given action I can predict
its consequences. Through a process of ‘motor equivalence’ I can use this
information also to predict the consequences of actions performed by oth-
ers. This implicit, automatic, and unconscious process of motor simulation
enables the observer to use his/her own resources to penetrate the world of
the other without the need for theorizing about it.. .” (2001, 41).
This motor equivalence, made possible by the impartial affordances of
the world and the predictability of motor patterns, is no less than the ba-
sis of sociality because it allows for recognition of the other as a conspe-
cific: “Action is the ‘a priori’ principle enabling social bonds to be initially
established. By an implicit process of action simulation, when I observe
other acting individuals I can immediately recognize them as goal- directed
agents like me, because the very same neural substrate is activated as when
I myself am bound to achieve the same goal by acting” (42).
We grasp others’ intentions because, in one sense, we already share those
intentions (they reflect our own motor schema). We recognize the other as
like us, not through interpretive effort but because we feel the resemblance
between our bodies and theirs, between our relations with the world and
theirs.
This view of mirror neurons leads to several strong claims.^7 First, while
mirror neurons work without cognition, introspection, or mental effort,