Jacobs’ lawyers, in turn, f iled a motion to
dismiss Scott’s suit, arguing that Jacobs
should also be immune. Given the evidence
Scott had gathered, he assumed that there
was little chance that the judge, Thomas
Varlan, would side with Jacobs. But, in Sep-
tember 2014, Varlan did just that—issuing
an opinion that effectively killed the suit.
Scott received the opinion by email.
When he opened it, he was heartbroken
as well as embarrassed. He knew that he
had only one move left that could possibly
save the case, and it was a long shot.
Over time, Scott had grown close with
Ansol and Janie Clark. When he called and
told them about the judge’s decision, he
promised to take the case to the Sixth Cir-
cuit Cour t of Appeals. Statistically, he had
only a 16 percent chance of winning. But
if he didn’t advocate for the workers, likely
no one else would, not with an opponent
as formidable as Jacobs. One of the top
30 largest government contractors in the
U.S., the company earns some $12 billion
in annual revenue and employs 80,000
people. Scott knew that he was in for a
f ight. He just didn’t yet k now how desper-
ate that f ight would become.ON MARCH 5, 2015, Ansol Clark was in
his bedroom, getting dressed to feed hisoff ice. “These people had a right to know
what was going into their bodies and what
might harm or kill them,” he said. “[Jacobs]
made them feel like they could walk on
water and be f ine, but the fact of the matter
is that they walked into their deathbeds.”PART IV—THE LAWSUIT
In August 2013, Scott f iled a complaint in
U.S. District Court in Knoxville against
Jacobs Engineering Group on behalf of 50
Kingston workers and their families. In
the U.S., federal agencies such as T.V.A.
enjoy immunity from lawsuits, with few
exceptions. Since Scott couldn’t sue T.V.A.
directly, Jacobs was, in a way, the next
best thing.
He was still pursuing the case largely
alone. In the run-up to f iling the com-
plaint, he’d worked past 10 most nights,
while still trying to spend time with his
two sons. “The stress level was just abso-
lutely unbearable,” he said. His marriage
had shown signs of strain. Still, Scott said,
“I didn’t think the law should tolerate this
kind of activity.”
He soon encountered a problem. A
recent court ruling concerning property
damage had determined that two T.V.A.
contractors would share in its sovereign
immunity regarding the Kingston spill.hard-pressed to land a job elsewhere, much
less one that paid as well. And these were
family men, with children and wives and
parents to care for. So, from 2009 to 2011,
they said little. “Nobody would talk about
nothing out there,” Mike McCarthy said.
“Everyone was job scared.” Because, to
them, it seemed that whoever complained,
or got hurt, or caused problems, would be
furloughed and never brought back.
It wasn’t until Jim Scott started to poke
around, in late 2012, that some workers
began to speak up. On their lunch breaks,
they’d pieced together that they shared
many of the same health issues—perhaps
most troubling, an inability to maintain an
erection. One worker named Billy Isley, a
buff Metallica fan in his mid-40s, saw his
sex drive plummet, so much so that his
wife, Lena, started to wonder, Is he screw-
ing around on me? In May 2013, Isley visited
a doctor. “Come to f ind out,” Lena said, “his
testosterone level was, like, 54”—less than
t hat of some women. (The normal range for
adult males is 250 to 900.) Tests also con-
f irmed that Isley’s blood contained traces of
arsenic, lead, and mercury. “When I looked
at the results,” Lena said, “I about died.”
That same month, some 25 workers
requested respiratory gear or dust masks
from Jacobs. They were denied. In a depo-
sition, Tom Bock later said that T.V.A.
had evaluated on-site air-monitor records
and found no link between the workers’
symptoms and the coal ash. The workers
suspected another reason for the denial.
“They were afraid the public would see us
in those masks,” Jeff Brewer said.
In time, Scott discovered an email that
suggested as much. It was sent in Octo-
ber 2009. In it, Sean Healey, a top Jacobs
off icial, instructs Bock not to use the word
“decon” (for “decontamination”) in refer-
ence to the cleanup. “The site control efforts
we undertake are primarily for the benef it
of public perception,” Healey writes, “and
given what we know about f ly ash are not
based on any type of occupational health
risk.” (Bock, in a deposition, claimed that
he didn’t know what Healey meant by this.
Healey declined an interview request.)
In the summer of 2013, Scott hap-
pened upon a site-wide safety and health
plan for the Kingston cleanup. Signed off
on by E.P.A., T.V.A., and Jacobs off icials,
the plan listed 23 constituents of coal ash,
including arsenic, lead, and beryllium—a
Long Island Iced Tea of poison. “[T.V.A.]
had it basically hidden on the internet,”
Scott said of the plan. “The workers didn’t
know it existed.” Scott handed out copies of
the plan whenever workers stopped by his
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