Kaya Genc
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problems that people care about, but a
few dozen ocers are hardly sucient
for a nation o 82 million. For almost a
century, elected ministers tackled the
concerns o their constituents; today,
appointed members o boards specializing
in education, culture, and technology
have been made responsible for develop-
ing policy. A corporatist economy and
a culture o favoritism in politics, the
media, and the public sector are on the
rise. Majoritarianism increasingly de¿nes
domestic politics. In the ¬¶’s view,
these tactics o control are necessary to
keep a multiethnic and polarized country
in order. But they in fact deepen the
systemic failings o Turkish democracy:
the weakness o institutions, the lack
o press scrutiny, and the ruthless pace o
cultural shifts over the past century.
Instead o solving these problems, the
¦ has chosen to be victimized by them.
Despite such challenges, Turkey’s
civil society remains strong. Turkey has
52 million active social media users. In
recent years, initiatives focusing on the
security o ballot counting, fact checking
in the media, §³¡Ï rights, and violence
against women have gained traction. As
the Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk has
noted, “Once a country gets too rich and
complex, the leader may think himsel
to be too powerful, but individuals also
feel powerful.” Erdogan’s great challenge
over the next decade, as individualism
grows in Turkey and Islamophobic
populism rises in Europe, will be to
convince voters that his mixture o anger
and patience is still a model to follow,
that his formation story can continue to
inspire, and that only his unassailable
ability can steer Turkey to safety. Erdo-
gan will no doubt do everything in his
power to succeed at this daunting task.∂The alarming state o Turkey’s
economy is a more threatening problem.
Last year, the Turkish lira lost 28 percent
o its value, and this year, food prices
have increased by 30 percent. From July
2018 to July 2019, the unemployment
rate rose by four percent, swelling the
ranks o unemployed Turks from 3.2
million to 4.5 million. Further aggravat-
ing Turks has been the rise in the
number o Syrian refugees making their
home in Turkey (more than 3.6 million
o them, as o June 2019). It was thus
little surprise that in local elections held
in March and June, the ¦ saw its share
o the vote fall dramatically in numerous
cities, including the capital, Ankara.
In spite o these cracks, the “brick
wall” Erdogan has patiently built
remains intact. The ¦ has around 11
million party members, ten times as
many as the Republican People’s Party,
the party Ataturk founded in 1923.
Aligning with the ¦ today opens up
career opportunities for Turks from
dierent social classes, much as aligning
with Ataturk’s party did in the 1930s.
Recently, as i to assist future biogra-
phers, Erdogan periodized his reign. In
a television interview, he named his
Islamist years, in the Welfare Party and
as mayor o Istanbul, as an “apprentice-
ship.” His time as a reformist prime
minister was his “journeymanship.” But
it is his years in the presidency that, in
Erdogan’s view, deserve the privileged
title o “mastership.” Now 65, Erdogan
rules with little separation o powers;
that was inevitable, he believes, after the
very public betrayal o former allies. In
the presidential palace, plasma screens
track which news stories are most widely
read in the country, requiring specialists
to rapidly address the snowballing