52 VIETNAM
:MÆMK\QVOWV\PM.ZMVKPLMJIKTM at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, when
French forces trying maintain their colonial rule in Vietnam lost a
war against a communist-led independence movement, President
Dwight D. Eisenhower observed, “You have a row of dominoes set up.
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the certainty that it will go over very quickly.” Eisenhower had not
only Indochina in mind, but the recent war in Korea and
“loss” of China to Mao Zedong’s communists in 1949.
Sixteen years later, Eisenhower’s vice president,
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no theory” at a press conference: “Now I know there
are those who say the domino theory is obsolete. They
haven’t talked to the dominoes. They should talk to the
Thais, to the Malaysians, to the Singaporeans, to the
Indonesians, to the Filipinos, to the Japanese, and the
rest. And if the United States leaves Vietnam in a way
that we are humiliated or defeated... this will be im-
mensely discouraging to the 300 million people from
Japan clear around to Thailand in free Asia; and even
more important it will be ominously encouraging to
the leaders of Communist China and the Soviet Union
who are supporting the North Vietnamese.”
In President John F. Kennedy’s 1961 inaugu-
ral address, he warned, “Our security may be
lost piece by piece, country by country.” Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson put it this way: “If you
let a bully come into your front yard one day, the
next day he’ll be up on your porch and the day
after that he’ll rape your wife in your own bed.”
The domino theory emerged from the experi-
ences of these men, and their advisers, during
World War II. There was a shared understanding among their gener-
ation that the appeasement at Munich in 1938, which allowed Adolf
Hitler to annex part of Czechoslovakia, had emboldened him, and
more dominoes began to fall: all of Czechoslovakia and Poland.
The domino theory is really shorthand for a larger set of assump-
tions that informed U.S. “war aims”—the desired outcomes, stated
and unstated, of a political-military strategy—with regard to Viet-
nam and its neighborhood from the 1950s through the 1970s.
In 1956, Kennedy, then a U.S. senator, claimed that Vietnam wasINSET:^CORBISVIAGETTYIMAGES;^ BOTTOM:^ PHOTO12 /UIGVIAGETTYIMAGES2][\?IZ+ZQ\MZQI
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for going to war, why a war is fought)4MOQ\QUI\MI]\PWZQ\a"
Supreme political authorities
are morally responsible for
the security of their constitu-
ents and therefore are
obligated to make decisions
about war and peace.
2][\KI][M" Self-defense of
citizens’ lives, livelihoods and
way of life are typically just
causes; more generally
speaking, the cause is just if it
rights a past wrong, punishes
wrongdoers or prevents
further injury.
:QOP\QV\MV\" Political motivations
are subject to ethical scrutiny;
violence intended for the purpose of
order, justice and ultimate concilia-
tion is just, whereas violence of
hatred, revenge and destruction is
not just.
4QSMTQPWWLWN[]KKM[[" Political
leaders should consider whether or
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ence in real-world outcomes. This
principle is subject to context and
judgment because it may be appropri-
ate to act despite a low likelihood of
success (e.g. against local genocide).
Conversely, it may be inappropriate to
IK\L]M\WTW_MЅKIKaLM[XQ\M\PM
compelling nature of the case.
8ZWXWZ\QWVITQ\aWNMVL[" Does the
preferred outcome justify, in terms
of the cost in lives and material
resources, this course of action?
4I[\ZM[WZ\" Have traditional
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reasonably employed in order to avoid
outright bloodshed?2][QVJMTTW(moral conduct during
war, how a war is fought)
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tools and tactics employed propor-
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,Q[KZQUQVI\QWV" Has care been
taken to reasonably protect the lives
and property of legitimate noncomba-
tants?Dwight D. Eisenhower
greets South Vietnam
President Ngo Dinh Diem
in Washington in 1957.
Eisenhower feared that
if Vietnam fell to the
communists, so could
other countries, like
“a row of dominoes.”George Kennan,
a U.S. diplomat,
argued for a policy
of “containment”
to stop the Soviets’
attempt to spread
communism across
the globe.