Eighth”) of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF)
joined these forces in the UK on 17 August 1942.
Of Bomber Command’s 125,000 aircrew, 20,000
were Australians, 6,000 were New Zealanders, and 50,000
came from Canada. Bomber Command’s accomplish-
ments came at a horrific cost. One source says Bomber
Command sustained 79,281 casualties, and America
79,265. Of Bomber Command’s casualties, 55,573 were
killed, 72% of whom were British. More than 9,000
Bomber Command aircraft were destroyed. One out of
every four Canadians killed in the war died in Bomber
Command, and one out of every five Australians killed
died serving in the Royal Air Force.
Take my Dad’s Squadron as an example. The Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) seconded my father, Ro-
land W. MacKenzie DFC, to the RAF. There he piloted
a Lancaster in Bomber Command’s 166 Squadron for
thirty-four combat sorties from April to August 1944. His
squadron flew from January 1943 until the end of the war.
In those fifty-two months, 944 aircrew in 166 Squadron
were killed. Their average age was twenty-three. Of these,
148 were Canadians, forty-five were Australians, and
eleven were New Zealanders. Most RAF Squadrons had
multiple Commonwealth airmen in their aircrews. The
losses were horrific, but the results were vital to victory.Bomber Command ControversiesW
hile hailed as heroic during most of the war,
Bomber Command became a subject of con-
troversy afterwards. The three most divisive
subjects are bombing accuracy, the ethics of bombing cit-
ies, and Dresden.
Bombing accuracy was brought into question by Da-
vid Butt’s Cabinet Report of August 1941, which the RAF
disputed but Churchill believed. It led to the British Area
Bombing Directive of 15 February 1942, which was in
turn replaced by the Casablanca Directive of 4 February- These Directives aroused debate about the merits
of precision bombing versus area bombing. What many
decision makers during the Second World War failed to
understand, however, was that this was oftentimes a dis-
tinction without a difference. The necessary technology
for precision bombing developed only gradually during
the war. Bombing accuracy and effectiveness steadily im-
proved as the war progressed, with the introduction of ev-
ery latest innovation, and especially when Bomber Com-
mand created “Pathfinders” to locate and mark targets.
The ethics of bombing cities arose from the reali-
ty that most German heavy industry was located in cit-
ies—and so ipso facto were the workers. Given the Allies’
demand at Casablanca for unconditional surrender, the
Lancaster Bomber being escorted by a Hawker HurricaneEighth”)oftheUnitedStatesArmyAirForce(USAAF)
joinedtheseforcesintheUKon 17 August1942.
Of Bomber Command’s 125,000 aircrew, 20,000
wereAustralians,6,000wereNewZealanders,and50,000
came from Canada. Bomber Command’s accomplish-
mentscameata horrificcost.OnesourcesaysBomber
Command sustained 79,281 casualties, and America
79,265.OfBomberCommand’scasualties,55,573were
killed, 72% of whom were British. More than 9,000
BomberCommandaircraftweredestroyed.Oneoutof
everyfourCanadianskilledin thewardied inBomber
Command,andone outofeveryfiveAustralianskilled
diedservingintheRoyalAirForce.
Take my Dad’s Squadron as an example. The Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) seconded my father, Ro-
land W. MacKenzie DFC, to the RAF. There he piloted
a Lancaster in Bomber Command’s 166 Squadron for
thirty-four combat sorties from April to August 1944. His
squadron flew from January 1943 until the end of the war.
In those fifty-two months, 944 aircrew in 166 Squadron
were killed. Their average age was twenty-three. Of these,
148 were Canadians, forty-five were Australians, and
eleven were New Zealanders. Most RAF Squadrons had
multiple Commonwealth airmen in their aircrews. The
losses were horrific, but the results were vital to victory.
Bomber Command ControversiesW
hile hailed as heroic during most of the war,
Bomber Command became a subject of con-
troversy afterwards. The three most divisive
subjects are bombing accuracy, the ethics of bombing cit-
ies,andDresden.
Bombing accuracy was brought into question by Da-
vid Butt’s Cabinet Report of August 1941, which the RAF
disputed but Churchill believed. It led to the British Area
Bombing Directive of 15 February 1942, which was in
turn replaced by the Casablanca Directive of 4 February- These Directives aroused debate about the merits
of precision bombing versus area bombing. What many
decision makers during the Second World War failed to
understand, however, was that this was oftentimes a dis-
tinction without a difference. The necessary technology
for precision bombing developed only gradually during
the war. Bombing accuracy and effectiveness steadily im-
proved as the war progressed, with the introduction of ev-
ery latest innovation, and especially when Bomber Com-
mandcreated“Pathfinders”tolocateandmarktargets.
The ethics of bombing cities arose from the reali-
ty that most German heavy industry was located in cit-
ies—and so ipso facto were the workers. Given the Allies’
demand at Casablanca for unconditional surrender, the
Lancaster Bomber being escorted by a Hawker Hurricane