CHURCHILL AND PORTALa joint officer. He refused to play inter-service politics, if
it would detract from the overall fight. Secondly, Portal
fully understood the nuanced differences and require-
ments of his disparate organizations. The absence of Op-
erational Training Units (OTUs) from ACC necessitated
more frontline pilots. Portal knew some pilots would be
in training in the squadrons, because, in the absence of
OTUs, flying training had to take place there. The com-
bination of additional students and instructors led to a
higher squadron establishment than in other RAF squad-
rons. Portal analyzed the situation carefully on individual
merit before making a recommendation that Churchill
followed. But the Prime Minister was not done yet. He
soon chose another strategic approach.The MediterraneanI
n November 1940, Churchill complained of the
“astounding disparity between operational fighting
strength and the total ration strength personnel” in
the Mediterranean theater.^9 Arthur Longmore, the AirCommander in the Mediterranean, had
reported having 200 operationally fit air-
craft and 17,000 personnel, or about seven-
ty-seven Airmen per serviceable machine.
“The pilot question is even more pointed,”
Churchill observed. “Here we have just
under 1,000 pilots for only 220 serviceable
operational machines, or between 4 and 5
pilots for every machine. It is surely not nec-
essary, and when we see how very short we
are of pilots at home, it would seem a duty
to transfer some of these great numbers of
pilots for whom there are no machines fit to fly, or any use
for fighting, to home establishments.”^10(^) Portal’s reply was characteristically detailed and log-
ical: “The disparity between the number of men and the
number of aircraft on charge is always striking but it is not
really so great as you suggest. In addition to the 220 oper-
ationally fit aircraft of modern types, which you mention,
there are 530 serviceable aircraft of older types, some of
them obsolescent. A proportion of these are still engaged
on active operations and the rest in training co-operation
with the Army, communication and other similar duties;
all have to be maintained in a serviceable condition. There
are, therefore, 750 aircraft to compare with the 17,000
personnel. The latter of course include all the officers and
airmen employed on staffs, on transport, on defence of
aerodromes and on administrative and other duties.”^11
(^) Portal was as equally versed in the unique conditions
of Mediterranean Command as those of ACC. In this
case, there were two main factors. There were more air-
craft in the theatre than reported to Churchill, and, be-
Previous spread
Portal with Secretary of State
for Air Sir Archibald Sinclair
(seated upper row center)
July 1944
Left
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal,
seen in 1940
CHURCHILL AND PORTAL
a joint officer. He refused to play inter-service politics, if
it would detract from the overall fight. Secondly, Portal
fully understood the nuanced differences and require-
ments of his disparate organizations. The absence of Op-
erational Training Units (OTUs) from ACC necessitated
more frontline pilots. Portal knew some pilots would be
in training in the squadrons, because, in the absence of
OTUs, flying training had to take place there. The com-
bination of additional students and instructors led to a
higher squadron establishment than in other RAF squad-
rons. Portal analyzed the situation carefully on individual
merit before making a recommendation that Churchill
followed. But the Prime Minister was not done yet. He
soon chose another strategic approach.
The Mediterranean
I
n November 1940, Churchill complained of the
“astounding disparity between operational fighting
strength and the total ration strength personnel” in
the Mediterranean theater.^9 Arthur Longmore, the AirCommander in the Mediterranean, had
reported having 200 operationally fit air-
craft and 17,000 personnel, or about seven-
ty-seven Airmen per serviceable machine.
“The pilot question is even more pointed,”
Churchill observed. “Here we have just
under 1,000 pilots for only 220 serviceable
operational machines, or between 4 and 5
pilots for every machine. It is surely not nec-
essary, and when we see how very short we
are of pilots at home, it would seem a duty
to transfer some of these great numbers of
pilots for whom there are no machines fit to fly, or any use
for fighting, to home establishments.”^10(^) Portal’s reply was characteristically detailed and log-
ical: “The disparity between the number of men and the
number of aircraft on charge is always striking but it is not
really so great as you suggest. In addition to the 220 oper-
ationally fit aircraft of modern types, which you mention,
there are 530 serviceable aircraft of older types, some of
them obsolescent. A proportion of these are still engaged
on active operations and the rest in training co-operation
with the Army, communication and other similar duties;
all have to be maintained in a serviceable condition. There
are, therefore, 750 aircraft to compare with the 17,000
personnel. The latter of course include all the officers and
airmen employed on staffs, on transport, on defence of
aerodromesandonadministrativeandotherduties.”^11
Portal was as equally versed in the unique conditions
of Mediterranean Command as those of ACC. In this
case, there were two main factors. There were more air-
craft in the theatre than reported to Churchill, and, be-
Previous spread
Portal with Secretary of State
for Air Sir Archibald Sinclair
(seated upper row center)
July 1944
Left
Air Chief Marshal
Sir Charles Portal,
seen in 1940