ARTIST AND AVIATOR
My new Long Island friends continued to look for
material, and I was hopeful when they informed me that
they had additional research on Seversky done in the ear-
ly 1990s by an aerospace historian. It appeared that with-
in these personal papers, moreover, that there were doc-
uments proving the film’s appearance in Quebec. I went
through a portion of these papers, which were held at
the Cradle of Aviation Museum in New York, but found
nothing. I was told that there were plenty more of Sever-
sky’s papers in the system and that I should not give up.
But as of this writing, no more have been found.
More Frustrations
S
hort of primary source material from the conference
principals, I began branching out. General Laurence
Kuter was at Quebec as “Hap” Arnold’s assistant
chief of air staff for plans and combat operations. An early
air power historian, Murray Green, interviewed Seversky
on 16 April 1970. In this interview Seversky tells Green
the story of the film being shown at the conference and
states: “So Larry Kuter was ordered to fly this picture all
the way to Quebec. Did he tell you that story?” To which
Green replies, “I will ask him about it.”^2 The very next day,
17 April 1970, Green did an interview with Kuter...and
forgets to ask him about flying the film to Quebec! Kuter
died in 1979. History was now taunting me.
I looked for still other individuals who attended the
conference, but, along with Kuter, all of the key partici-
pants had passed away. So I began searching through the
names of staff that might still be alive. I was assisted by
two brilliant historians in this process, Dik Daso, curator
at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington,
and Duane Reed, historian at the US Air Force Academy.
They thought a member of Arnold’s staff might still be
alive. They had not heard of his passing, and such news
travels quickly in the tight-knit air-power community. I
began my quest to find Jacob Edward Smart.
After more than four months, I managed to track
down the retired ninety-five-year-old, four-star gener-
al in South Carolina and went to interview him. During
the Quebec Conference, he was indeed a key member of
Arnold’s staff. But he told me that he was only in atten-
dance at Quebec for the last three days. He missed most
of the conference because earlier in the month of August
1943, he was leading the bombing raids over the Ploesti
oil fields in Romania. He did recall seeing Seversky on a
number of occasions, but Smart could not have seen the
film in Quebec since he was not in attendance when it is
supposed to have been shown.
The Case for the Defense
D
espite the cold trail, there are historical clues that
help support the claim made about the showing
of the film. The most obvious is that the Allied
powers did emerge from the conference with a decided
bias towards long-range air power. A telegram from Roo-
sevelt and Churchill was sent to Marshal Stalin of the So-
viet Union on 24 August 1943 to bring him up to date on
strategic decisions agreed to at the conference. In a state-
ment that would have made Walt and Seversky proud, the
telegram read: “The bomber offensive against Germany
will be continued on a rapidly increased scale from bas-
es in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of
this air attack will be to destroy the German air combat
strength, to dislocate the Germany military, industrial,
and economic system.”^3
(^) While evidence independent of Disney and Seversky
is lacking, there is still a good case to be made based on
their personal accounts. I studied each one based on what
was said, when it was said, how it was said, and then—fi-
nally—by considering possible motives. I also took a look
at the various deviations from one version to another.
The claim did not appear during the war. This is not
surprising since the proceedings at the conference would
have been highly classified at the time. Attendees would
not have been permitted to speak about it until long af-
terwards. If Walt did know, he would have been bound
by secrecy. The same was true for Seversky. So the fact
that the story did not appear until a decade after the war is
not surprising. The Ultra Secret, after all, was not revealed
until three decades after the war.
The earliest version of the story comes from a 1956
interview Walt did with Pete Martin. In referring to Vic-
tory Through Air Power, Walt declares: “It was even flown
by special request to Quebec at the Quebec Conference
for Churchill and the others to see. And I got that straight
from the fellow who flew it up there and he was a General
in the Air Corps.”^4 (Walt is, of course, speaking of Lar-
ry Kuter.) Listening to the interview in context provides
even more insight into Walt’s thinking—he is talking ca-
sually, commenting on whatever comes into his mind,
and it is not rehearsed.
Seversky repeatedly told the story in interviews and
articles. The most notable is in a 1967 article he wrote
for Aerospace Historian, the official publication of the Air
Force Historical Foundation. Seversky wrote that “At the
request of Mr. Churchill, General Arnold asked General
Larry Kuter, who is now Vice President of Pan American
Airways, to have the film flown to Quebec at once. Presi-
dent Roosevelt and Churchill, closeted together, saw the
film twice.”^5 Not only did General Kuter get this publica-
ARTISTANDAVIATOR
MynewLong Islandfriends continuedto lookfor
material,andI washopefulwhentheyinformedmethat
theyhadadditionalresearchonSeverskydoneintheear-
ly1990sbyanaerospacehistorian.Itappearedthatwith-
inthesepersonalpapers,moreover,thatthereweredoc-
umentsprovingthefilm’sappearanceinQuebec.I went
througha portion of these papers, which wereheld at
theCradleofAviationMuseuminNewYork,butfound
nothing.I wastoldthattherewereplentymoreofSever-
sky’spapersinthesystemandthatI shouldnotgiveup.
Butasofthiswriting,nomorehavebeenfound.
MoreFrustrations
S
hortofprimarysourcematerialfromtheconference
principals,I beganbranchingout.GeneralLaurence
Kuter wasat Quebec as “Hap”Arnold’sassistant
chiefofairstaffforplansandcombatoperations.Anearly
airpowerhistorian,MurrayGreen,interviewedSeversky
on 16 April1970.InthisinterviewSeverskytellsGreen
thestoryofthefilmbeingshownattheconferenceand
states:“SoLarryKuterwasorderedtoflythispictureall
thewaytoQuebec.Didhetellyouthatstory?”Towhich
Greenreplies,“Iwillaskhimaboutit.”^2 Theverynextday,
17 April1970,GreendidaninterviewwithKuter...and
forgetstoaskhimaboutflyingthefilmtoQuebec!Kuter
diedin1979.Historywasnowtauntingme.
I lookedforstillotherindividualswhoattendedthe
conference,but,alongwithKuter,allofthekeypartici-
pantshadpassedaway.SoI begansearchingthroughthe
namesofstaffthat mightstillbealive.I wasassistedby
twobrillianthistoriansinthisprocess,DikDaso,curator
attheNationalAirandSpaceMuseuminWashington,
andDuaneReed,historianattheUSAirForceAcademy.
Theythoughta memberofArnold’sstaff mightstillbe
alive.Theyhadnotheardofhispassing,andsuchnews
travelsquicklyinthetight-knitair-powercommunity.I
beganmyquesttofindJacobEdwardSmart.
After more than four months, I managed to track
down the retired ninety-five-year-old, four-star gener-
al in South Carolina and went to interview him. During
the Quebec Conference, he was indeed a key member of
Arnold’s staff. But he told me that he was only in atten-
dance at Quebec for the last three days. He missed most
of the conference because earlier in the month of August
1943, he was leading the bombing raids over the Ploesti
oil fields in Romania. He did recall seeing Seversky on a
number of occasions, but Smart could not have seen the
film in Quebec since he was not in attendance when it is
supposed to have been shown.
The Case for the Defense
D
espite the cold trail, there are historical clues that
help support the claim made about the showing
of the film. The most obvious is that the Allied
powers did emerge from the conference with a decided
bias towards long-range air power. A telegram from Roo-
sevelt and Churchill was sent to Marshal Stalin of the So-
viet Union on 24 August 1943 to bring him up to date on
strategic decisions agreed to at the conference. In a state-
ment that would have made Walt and Seversky proud, the
telegram read: “The bomber offensive against Germany
will be continued on a rapidly increased scale from bas-
es in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of
this air attack will be to destroy the German air combat
strength, to dislocate the Germany military, industrial,
andeconomicsystem.”^3
While evidence independent of Disney and Seversky
is lacking, there is still a good case to be made based on
their personal accounts. I studied each one based on what
was said, when it was said, how it was said, and then—fi-
nally—by considering possible motives. I also took a look
atthevariousdeviationsfromoneversiontoanother.
The claim did not appear during the war. This is not
surprising since the proceedings at the conference would
have been highly classified at the time. Attendees would
not have been permitted to speak about it until long af-
terwards. If Walt did know, he would have been bound
by secrecy. The same was true for Seversky. So the fact
that the story did not appear until a decade after the war is
not surprising. The Ultra Secret, after all, was not revealed
untilthreedecadesafterthewar.
The earliest version of the story comes from a 1956
interview Walt did with Pete Martin. In referring to Vic-
tory Through Air Power, Walt declares: “It was even flown
by special request to Quebec at the Quebec Conference
for Churchill and the others to see. And I got that straight
from the fellow who flew it up there and he was a General
in the Air Corps.”^4 (Walt is, of course, speaking of Lar-
ry Kuter.) Listening to the interview in context provides
even more insight into Walt’s thinking—he is talking ca-
sually, commenting on whatever comes into his mind,
andit isnotrehearsed.
Seversky repeatedly told the story in interviews and
articles. The most notable is in a 1967 article he wrote
for Aerospace Historian, the official publication of the Air
Force Historical Foundation. Seversky wrote that “At the
request of Mr. Churchill, General Arnold asked General
Larry Kuter, who is now Vice President of Pan American
Airways, to have the film flown to Quebec at once. Presi-
dent Roosevelt and Churchill, closeted together, saw the
film twice.”^5 Not only did General Kuter get this publica-