for Britain’s self-acknowledged war
with the Bolsheviks. But other than
to persuade the War Cabinet to
withdraw British troops in Northern
Russia—a decision made before
Churchill entered the Cabinet as Sec-
retary for War but which he success-
fully implemented—Lloyd George
never did this. As a consequence, the
Cabinet lurched from crisis to crisis
during the summer of 1919 when
it came to making decisions about
offering aid in the form of munitions,
food, and trade to the anti-Bolshevik
armies operating in Northern and
Southern Russia.
Churchill outlined his position
on “Britain’s Foreign Policy” in the
22 June edition of The Weekly Dis-
patch. In it, he urged four specific
points: (1) that Britain remain “firm
friends” with the United States; (2)
that it “in concert with the United
States...aid and protect France who
has been so terribly weakened by...
the war”; (3) that Germany “after
an interval which should not be too
long, should take her place in the
League of Nations” because “we
cannot afford to drive the German
Nation into the jaws of Russian Bol-
shevism.”
His fourth point was that “Rus-
sia, too, will be wanted in the League
of Nations as one of the great agents
and guarantors of the peace and
progress of the world. But Bolshevik
Russia can never form part of such a
League. The Bolshevik leaders them-
selves would be the first to admit
this....They seek as the first condi-
tion of their being the overthrow and
destruction of...every...Govern-
ment now standing in the world.”
Churchill summarized this last
point: “To sustain and encourage all
those forces in Russia which are striv-
ing for the destruction of the Bolshe-
vik tyranny and the establishment of
the Russian people upon a broad and
genuine democratic basis.”Notwithstanding the War Cabi-
net’s recognition that “a state of war”
existed between Britain and the Bol-
sheviks, nothing remotely resembling
Churchill’s proposed foreign policy
on Russia was ever adopted. On the
evening of 29 July, after the Cabinet
failed to adopt his policy, Churchill
spoke in the House of Commons and
neatly summarized the policy toward
Russia that, by default, became Brit-
ish foreign policy: “We should make
a fatal mistake if we assume...that we
should not interest ourselves in the
affairs of Russia, and that we should
leave the Russian people to stew in
their own juice.” Sadly, what Chur-
chill feared came to pass.75 Years^ ago
Summer 1944 • Age (^69)
“Get anything out of the Air
Force you can....”
F
ollowing the success of the
D-Day landings, new develop-
ments in the war kept Chur-
chill fully occupied in the summer
of 1944. On 13 June, the Germans
began firing V-1 rockets at Britain.
By 6 July, these terror weapons had
killed 2,752 civilians, more than the
2,443 British troops killed during the
Normandy landings. When Home
Secretary Herbert Morrison suggest-
ed that some Allied forces in France
be diverted from their drive toward
Germany and sent to capture V-1
launching sites on the French coast,
Churchill said no. The Prime Minis-
ter explained somewhat callously to
the House of Commons that: “This
form of attack is, no doubt, of a trying
character, a worrisome character...
but people have just got to get used
to that.”
Early in July, the British gov-
ernment learned that more than
two-and-half million Jews had been
murdered in gas chambers at Aus-chwitz, previously thought to be
only a slave-labor camp. Zionist
leader Chaim Weizmann appealed
to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
to bomb the railways from Budapest
leading to the camp. Eden passed
this on to Churchill who told Eden,
“Get anything out of the Air Force
you can, and invoke me if necessary.”
Eden went to the Secretary State
for Air, who told him it was “out of
our power,” as it could be done only
during daylight raids, which the RAF
could not do. Only the Americans
flew daylight bombing, and the US
War Department had turned down
such a request on 26 June. US policy
subsequently remained unchanged.
Churchill sailed for Quebec on 5
September to attend another confer-
ence with President Roosevelt. He
was accompanied by his wife Clem-
entine and arrived in Nova Scotia
on 10 September, where they took a
train to Quebec City and were greet-
ed at the station by President Roos-
evelt and his wife Eleanor. During the
meetings, FDR floated the scheme
conceived by Treasury Secretary
Henry Morgenthau to convert “Ger-
many into a country primarily agri-
cultural and pastoral in its character,”
with no industrialization permitted.
Churchill and FDR signed an agree-
ment to this effect. In a telegram to
the War Cabinet, Churchill said that
he “was at first taken aback” by the
proposal but then began to think of
“the beneficial consequences to us”
that might follow. The plan quickly
died, however, for various reasons.
Among them, Churchill changed his
mind when Field Marshal Brooke
“pointed out that a populous Germa-
ny would be needed as a future ally
against Russia.” ,for Britain’s self-acknowledged war
with the Bolsheviks. But other than
to persuade the War Cabinet to
withdraw British troops in Northern
Russia—a decision made before
Churchill entered the Cabinet as Sec-
retary for War but which he success-
fully implemented—Lloyd George
never did this. As a consequence, the
Cabinet lurched from crisis to crisis
during the summer of 1919 when
it came to making decisions about
offering aid in the form of munitions,
food, and trade to the anti-Bolshevik
armies operating in Northern and
SouthernRussia.
Churchill outlined his position
on “Britain’s Foreign Policy” in the
22 June edition of The Weekly Dis-
patch. In it, he urged four specific
points: (1) that Britain remain “firm
friends” with the United States; (2)
that it “in concert with the United
States...aid and protect France who
has been so terribly weakened by...
the war”; (3) that Germany “after
an interval which should not be too
long, should take her place in the
League of Nations” because “we
cannot afford to drive the German
Nation into the jaws of Russian Bol-
shevism.”
His fourth point was that “Rus-
sia, too, will be wanted in the League
of Nations as one of the great agents
and guarantors of the peace and
progress of the world. But Bolshevik
Russia can never form part of such a
League. The Bolshevik leaders them-
selves would be the first to admit
this....They seek as the first condi-
tion of their being the overthrow and
destruction of...every...Govern-
mentnowstandingintheworld.”
Churchill summarized this last
point: “To sustain and encourage all
those forces in Russia which are striv-
ing for the destruction of the Bolshe-
vik tyranny and the establishment of
the Russian people upon a broad and
genuine democratic basis.”
NotwithstandingtheWarCabi-
net’srecognitionthat“astateofwar”
existedbetweenBritainandtheBol-
sheviks,nothingremotelyresembling
Churchill’sproposedforeignpolicy
onRussiawaseveradopted.Onthe
eveningof 29 July,aftertheCabinet
failedtoadopthispolicy,Churchill
spokeintheHouseofCommonsand
neatlysummarizedthepolicytoward
Russiathat,bydefault,becameBrit-
ishforeignpolicy:“Weshouldmake
a fatalmistakeif weassume...thatwe
shouldnotinterestourselvesinthe
affairsofRussia,andthatweshould
leavetheRussianpeopletostewin
theirownjuice.”Sadly,whatChur-
chillfearedcametopass.75 Yearsago
Summer 1944 • Age 69
“GetanythingoutoftheAir
Forceyoucan....”F
ollowingthesuccessofthe
D-Daylandings,newdevelop-
mentsinthewarkeptChur-
chillfullyoccupiedinthesummer
of1944.On 13 June,theGermans
beganfiringV-1rocketsatBritain.
By6 July,theseterrorweaponshad
killed2,752civilians,morethanthe
2,443Britishtroopskilledduringthe
Normandylandings.WhenHome
SecretaryHerbertMorrisonsuggest-
edthatsomeAlliedforcesinFrance
bedivertedfromtheirdrivetoward
GermanyandsenttocaptureV-1
launchingsitesontheFrenchcoast,
Churchillsaidno.ThePrimeMinis-
terexplainedsomewhatcallouslyto
theHouseofCommonsthat:“This
formofattackis,nodoubt,ofa trying
character,a worrisomecharacter...
butpeoplehavejustgottogetused
tothat.”
Early in July, the British gov-
ernment learned that more than
two-and-half million Jews had been
murdered in gas chambers at Aus-chwitz, previously thought to be
only a slave-labor camp. Zionist
leader Chaim Weizmann appealed
to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
to bomb the railways from Budapest
leading to the camp. Eden passed
this on to Churchill who told Eden,
“Get anything out of the Air Force
you can, and invoke me if necessary.”
Eden went to the Secretary State
for Air, who told him it was “out of
our power,” as it could be done only
during daylight raids, which the RAF
could not do. Only the Americans
flew daylight bombing, and the US
War Department had turned down
such a request on 26 June. US policy
subsequentlyremainedunchanged.
Churchill sailed for Quebec on 5
September to attend another confer-
ence with President Roosevelt. He
was accompanied by his wife Clem-
entine and arrived in Nova Scotia
on 10 September, where they took a
train to Quebec City and were greet-
ed at the station by President Roos-
evelt and his wife Eleanor. During the
meetings, FDR floated the scheme
conceived by Treasury Secretary
Henry Morgenthau to convert “Ger-
many into a country primarily agri-
cultural and pastoral in its character,”
with no industrialization permitted.
Churchill and FDR signed an agree-
ment to this effect. In a telegram to
the War Cabinet, Churchill said that
he “was at first taken aback” by the
proposal but then began to think of
“the beneficial consequences to us”
that might follow. The plan quickly
died, however, for various reasons.
Among them, Churchill changed his
mind when Field Marshal Brooke
“pointed out that a populous Germa-
ny would be needed as a future ally
against Russia.” ,