reputation for napping in the cor-
ner after lengthy formal dinners,
which became the talk of Singapore
colonial society.
Increasingly critical reports
reached Churchill and the London
Cabinet. Australia was especial-
ly nervous and displeased with
British defensive efforts. When
British Minister of Information
Duff Cooper was dispatched to the
Far East to investigate, Brooke-
Popham was justifiably worried
about what Duff Cooper would tell
London. Cooper was not pleased. In
November 1941, Churchill replaced
Brooke-Popham, thanking him for
his nearly one year of service as
Commander-in-Chief of the Far
East Command, and offering him
a baronetcy—which was never
bestowed. Before Brooke-Popham
reached Britain by passenger ship,
the bastion at Singapore fell to Ja-
pan. Churchill refused to meet with
Brooke-Popham upon his return,
and the air-marshal maintained a
lifelong, public, stoic silence. His
sister committed suicide, which
many blamed on the family’s publichumiliation following the surren-
der of Singapore. Interestingly,
Brooke-Popham’s name never
appears in Churchill’s History of
the Second World War, but Chur-
chill himself does accept personal
responsibility for the failure in
Singapore.
Though Brooke-Popham was
not a major actor in the broad
sense, his life and times are well
worth recounting, and Dye has
written a well-researched biog-
raphy. To Churchill, the air chief
marshal was never a great com-
mander and, in the end, a failure at
his assigned task. Churchill seldom
forgave failures.
Yet as Dye’s book makes clear,
Brooke-Popham was far from
solely responsible for the defeat at
Singapore and the collapse of the
British military power in the Far
East. In fact, Brooke-Popham was
very much a mirror of the calmer
Victorian-Edwardian era, but the
personality and military instincts
that served him well earlier in his
career were not assets in the Sec-
ond World War, a time of radicallychanged geopolitics and cultural
expectations. In addition, his com-
mand in the Far East suffered from
an over-stretched British Empire
and, eventfully, a war with three
major military powers (Germany,
Italy, and Japan). Dye paints a
picture of a decent and well-mean-
ing man, but one not up to the final
assignment he was given.
The Naval Institute Press has
published a handsome volume in
its History of Military Aviation
series, with excellent photography,
maps, and an outstanding dust
jacket. One weakness is the index,
which misses some prominent
names cited in the text. The bibli-
ography is excellent, and the notes
section informative. Clearly, the
book makes a major contribution
to recounting the life of a signifi-
cant individual and understanding
the challenges facing Great Britain
in the Far East on the eve of the
Second World War. ,W. Mark Hamilton is author of The
Nation and the Navy: Methods and
Organization of British Navalist
Propaganda, 1889–1914 (1986).BOOKS, ARTS, AND CURIOSITIESHawker Hurricanereputationfornappinginthecor-
nerafterlengthyformaldinners,
whichbecamethetalkofSingapore
colonialsociety.
Increasingly critical reports
reached Churchill and the London
Cabinet. Australia was especial-
ly nervous and displeased with
British defensive efforts. When
British Minister of Information
Duff Cooper was dispatched to the
Far East to investigate, Brooke-
Popham was justifiably worried
about what Duff Cooper would tell
London. Cooper was not pleased. In
November 1941, Churchill replaced
Brooke-Popham, thanking him for
his nearly one year of service as
Commander-in-Chief of the Far
East Command, and offering him
a baronetcy—which was never
bestowed. Before Brooke-Popham
reached Britain by passenger ship,
the bastion at Singapore fell to Ja-
pan. Churchill refused to meet with
Brooke-Popham upon his return,
and the air-marshal maintained a
lifelong, public, stoic silence. His
sister committed suicide, which
many blamed on the family’s public
humiliationfollowingthesurren-
derofSingapore.Interestingly,
Brooke-Popham’snamenever
appearsinChurchill’sHistoryof
theSecondWorldWar,butChur-
chillhimselfdoesacceptpersonal
responsibilityforthefailurein
Singapore.
ThoughBrooke-Pophamwas
nota majoractorinthebroad
sense,hislifeandtimesarewell
worthrecounting,andDyehas
writtena well-researchedbiog-
raphy.ToChurchill,theairchief
marshalwasnevera greatcom-
manderand,intheend,a failureat
hisassignedtask.Churchillseldom
forgavefailures.
YetasDye’sbookmakesclear,
Brooke-Pophamwasfarfrom
solelyresponsibleforthedefeatat
Singaporeandthecollapseofthe
BritishmilitarypowerintheFar
East.Infact,Brooke-Pophamwas
verymucha mirrorofthecalmer
Victorian-Edwardianera,butthe
personalityandmilitaryinstincts
thatservedhimwellearlierinhis
careerwerenotassetsintheSec-
ondWorldWar,a timeofradicallychangedgeopoliticsandcultural
expectations.Inaddition,hiscom-
mandintheFarEastsufferedfrom
anover-stretchedBritishEmpire
and,eventfully,a warwiththree
majormilitarypowers(Germany,
Italy,andJapan).Dyepaintsa
pictureofa decentandwell-mean-
ingman,butonenotuptothefinal
assignmenthewasgiven.
The Naval Institute Press has
published a handsome volume in
its History of Military Aviation
series, with excellent photography,
maps, and an outstanding dust
jacket. One weakness is the index,
which misses some prominent
names cited in the text. The bibli-
ography is excellent, and the notes
section informative. Clearly, the
book makes a major contribution
to recounting the life of a signifi-
cant individual and understanding
the challenges facing Great Britain
in the Far East on the eve of the
Second World War. ,W. Mark Hamilton is author of The
Nation and the Navy: Methods and
Organization of British Navalist
Propaganda, 1889–1914 (1986).BOOKS, ARTS, AND CURIOSITIESHawker Hurricane